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ABSTRACT 
 
TRANSFERRING URBAN RENT TO THE PUBLIC: 
LAND VALUE TAXATION 
Atan, Başak 
M.S., Department of Public Policy, 2014 
Supervisor: İzak Atiyas 
 
It is widely known that urban planning practice is becoming a tool of obtaining political 
and material rent because of lack of ‘urban land policy’ which guide governments’ and 
private sectors’ planning applications. As an outcome of becoming a capitalist society, 
current policies are focused on land that is mostly in the hands of individuals and land 
speculation is perceived as an investment instrument. In addition to the problems with 
urban land policy, Turkish economic policy is significantly depending on the 
construction industry. As a result of this reason, governments try to stimulate economic 
activity and create new employment opportunities through new construction projects. 
With the realized projects in recent years, there is huge spatial, economic and social 
intervention to the lives of the local people who suffer from the negative consequences 
of these processes but who cannot get enough share from rent. Since urban rent is 
formed over time and is not a product of one's labor, it shouldn’t be a product of only 
certain groups who profit. Urban rent which is formed as a result of urban development 
should be owned publicly. The basic motivation of the thesis is to discuss a proposal for 
‘Land Value Taxation’ as a policy tool in the context of a land policy which is based on 
transferring urban land to the public. International examples of Land Value Taxation 
implementations are investigated and benefits of Land Value Taxation are explained 
through various exercises. 
 
Keywords: Urban Rent, Land Value Taxation, Rent Creation, Rent Distribution 
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ÖZ 
 
KENTSEL RANTLARIN KAMUYA AKTARIMI:  
TOPRAK RANTI VERGİLENDİRMESİ 
Atan, Başak 
Yüksek Lisans; Kamu Politikaları, 2014 
Tez Yöneticisi: İzak Atiyas 
 
Günümüzde şehir planlama pratiği iktidarların ve özel sektörün planlama 
uygulamalarını yönlendiren bir kentsel arsa politikasının bulunmaması sebebiyle 
üzerinden siyasi ve maddi rant elde edilen bir araç haline gelmiştir. Kapitalist bir 
toplum olmanın getirisi olarak, uygulanan politikalar arsa sahipliliğinin çoğunlukla 
bireylerin elinde olmasına ve arsa spekülasyonun bir yatırım aracı olarak algılanmasına 
odaklıdır. Kentsel arsa politikasıyla ilgili problemlere ek olarak, Türkiye ekononomi 
politikası önemli derecede inşaat sektörüne bağlıdır. Bu sebeple, iktidarlar, yeni inşaat 
projeleriyle ekonomiyi canlandırarak bu yolla istihdam yaratmaya çalışmaktadırlar. 
Gerçekleştirilen projeler ile insanların fiziksel, sosyal ve ekonomik hayatlarına 
müdahale edilmekte, sürecin bütün olumsuzluklarını yaşayan halk ortaya çıkan ranttan 
yeterince pay alamamaktadır. Unutulmamalıdır ki kentsel rantlar zamanla oluşmaktadır 
ve tek bir kişinin ürünü değildir. Bu sebeple sadece belli zümrelerin kar ettiği bir ürün 
de olmamalıdır. Toplum tarafından yaratılan değer, yine toplum tarafından 
paylaşılmalıdır. Bu tezin temel güdülenmesi, Türkiye için kentsel rantların kamuya 
aktarımını esas alan bir Arsa Politikası kapsamında, politika aracı olarak ‘Toprak Rantı 
Vergilendirilmesi’ önerisi geliştirmektir. Bu bağlamda tez kapsamında Türkiye’de 
mevcut rant dağıtım araçlarına ek olarak, kentsel rantların formel olarak 
vergilendirilmesi önerilmektedir. Arsa Vergilendirmesi uygulaması uluslararası 
örneklerde incelemiş olup, çeşitli simulasyonlar ile faydaları anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. 
Anahtar sözcükler: Kentsel Rant, Toprak Rantının Vergilendirmesi, Rantın Yaratılması, 
Rantın Dağıtılması 
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CHAPTER I 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
It is widely known that urban planning practice is becoming a tool of obtaining political 
and material rent because of lack of ‘urban land policy’ which guide governments’ and 
private sectors’ planning applications. As an outcome of becoming a capitalist society, 
current policies are focused on land that is mostly in the hands of individuals and land 
speculation is perceived as an investment instrument. In addition to the problems with 
urban land policy, Turkish economic policy is significantly depending on the 
construction industry. As a result of this reason, governments try to stimulate economic 
activity and create new employment opportunities through new construction projects. 
Usually urban transformation projects, zoning regulations, major investment projects in 
order to achieve political gains such as ‘crazy1’ projects are the ways of stimulating the 
economy and taking advantage of accompanying financial surplus. With the realized  
projects in recent years, there is huge spatial , economic and social intervention to the 
lives of the local people who suffer from the negative consequences of these processes 
but who cannot get enough share from rent. Actors such as local governments, 
construction companies and entrepreneurs ignore the issue of fair sharing of the rent 
during planning interventions. Since urban rent is formed over time and is not a product 
of one's labor, it should not be a product of only certain groups who profit. Value 
created by the community should be shared by the community again. Urban rent which 
is formed as a result of urban development should be owned publicly. The thesis will 
                                                           
1 ‘Crazy’ project refers to waterway project which propose to connect Marmara and 
Black Sea with an artifical water gap. This project was the one of the promises of the 
2011 elections. The reason for describing as 'crazy' is that the project is a major 
intervention to the nature and it is difficult to estimate possible externalities. 
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focus on the ‘transferring urban rent to the public’ which can play a role to decrease 
income inequality and stop to uncontrolled structuring cities. The way to realize the 
transfer could be ‘land value taxation’ as an urban land and economy policy tool in 
addition to current rent distribution instruments. In the thesis, I framed my inquiry and 
research approach to explore the following questions: 
How is the urban rent created in Turkey?  
How is the urban rent shared or distributed in Turkey? 
What role do actors have in creating and sharing urban rent?  
How to transfer urban rent to the public? 
How to create policies for Turkey in order to provide benefit of all actors equally from 
urban rent and contribute social justice?  
I am going to find answers to these questions with explaining various types of rents 
discussed in the literature, explaining theoretical approaches on the production of urban 
land, examining how rents are generated and distributed in the Turkish case, the legal 
framework and in practice related to neoliberal policies and various approaches and 
methods proposed in the literature as well as various approaches used in different 
jurisdictions around the world to transfer this rent to the public such as Land Value 
Taxation. 
 
1.1. Aim, Argument and the Problematic of the Thesis 
Keleş has stated: What is meant of saying features of capitalist societies are also 
features of capitalist cities? Becoming land ownership in the hands of individuals rather 
than public leads high-income groups play a chief role in the planning of cities. Land 
and housing are made widely subject to trade. So much so, in this system, increase in 
land value as a result of speculation can be viewed favorably (Keleş; 2013:86). Today in 
Turkey, similar process has occurred which has been described by Keleş. In Turkey, 
which is trying to be integrated to the global economy, urban land is being subject to 
international and national trade. Creating rent with land speculation is viewed as an 
investment method and perceiving this situation as legitimate has started to create 
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danger in terms of public welfare and future of cities. Beside land speculation, rent 
acquisition from urban land with various state interventions is another important 
problem. Usually governments in Turkey use their power in this way in order to sustain 
the political power. Even though there are lots of attempts to create rent, there is nothing 
much to distribute rent to its real owners. For this reason, the aim of the thesis is to 
propose an appropriate taxation method fitting with political culture of Turkey in order 
to provide fair sharing of urban rent and avoid land speculation. 
My main argument in the study is as follow; 
Due to the current functioning of urban land and economy policy in Turkey, urban rent 
is not allocated fairly and this leads increase in income inequality and uncontrolled 
construction in cities. A new policy should be formulated to guide actions of 
government especially in terms of urban rent sharing implementations.  
In the thesis, ‘taxation urban land’ as an economic policy and urban land policy tool 
will be focused on. Importance will be given to rent creation and distribution 
instruments as a result of being financial resources of local governments and guiding 
planning implementations. So, in the thesis ‘Land Value Taxation’ proposal of Henry 
George will also be examined in the context of ‘Georgist Perspectives on City 
Planning’.  
According to Article 23 of the 1982 Constitution2, freedom of settlement may be limited 
by law in order to provide social and economic development, healthy and orderly urban 
growth. In addition to the Constitution, urban rent taxation issue is discussed in 8th Five 
Year Development Plan. In article 19313, it is stated that, urban land rent shall be taxed 
in order to be used in financing construction and infrastructure activities of local 
governments. The said articles of the Constitution and Development Plan are considered 
as legal basis for taxation proposal to be developed under the thesis. 
The thesis is designed firstly to understand land creation instruments through various 
urban planning interventions such as urban transformation processes, speculative ‘crazy 
projects’. How these rents were established and which actors benefit and suffer during 
these processes will be discussed with related legal regulations. While comparing 
                                                           
2 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf accessed 11.07.2014 
3http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Lists/Kalknma%20Planlar/Attachments/2/plan8.pdf 
accessed 19.07.2014 
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interventions/ land creation instruments, it is planned to reveal which urban planning 
interventions are most vulnerable for abusing produced value and which rent 
distribution instrument is most suitable for every rent creation type. Roles of actors, 
how these actors perform their duties from state, private companies to local people in a 
large sphere will be discussed. Networks, relations among interest groups also will be 
discussed. 
Before starting to explain transferring urban rent to the public, at first, urban land and 
private ownership problem are needed to be discussed. These problems can be classified 
as (Ulutaş; 2005:11); 
* Problems related with urban planning and development 
* Problems arising from societal and economical perspective 
* Political and ethical problems 
Tekeli explained that, speculation owing to presence of land ownership affect settlement 
decision of each person and institution. Therefore, it prevents the growth direction and 
intensity of cities taking place in the desired and planned way. According to Tekeli, 
land owners arrest of value created publicly. This affects economic development by two 
ways: First it causes that accumulation of wealth is in the hands of the class with 
sociologically very weak investment and entrepreneurial abilities. In this way, scarce 
real resources cannot be targeted to development goals. Second and probably more 
importantly, becoming subject of speculation and private gain, urban land tends to be 
used in a wasteful manner. In addition to these problems, Tekeli stated that the 
possibility of the formation of speculation puts urban planning in the middle of political 
pressures (Tekeli; 2009:26-27-28). 
These problems are important because they harm ‘public welfare’. Core subject of the 
thesis ‘Land Value Taxation’ will be discussed as a solution to these problems by 
intervening in the process of transfer of rents. 
There are quite number of studies explaining the transfer of urban rent to the public. 
One of the most important ideas came from Henry George who was an economist and 
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land reformer4. Edward Lawrence explained George’s view as ‘‘Henry George, on the 
other hand, felt that the problem was the private ownership of land. The landowner did 
not create the land, and he contributed nothing to production, but yet he could force 
others to pay him for the privilege of working on or living on the land, causing an 
increase in the disparity in wealth between those with land and those without. He 
proposed keeping the land in private ownership, but having the government tax 100% of 
the rental value each year. (Henry George later endorsed taxing just 90% of the rental 
value each year, leaving the property owner a 10% bonus or commission.) Taxing all or 
most of the rental value of the land would be justified, he said, because land is a gift of 
nature (or God), not a creation of man. The enhancement to land value comes from 
population growth and public improvements such as railroads, canals, highways, and 
various public works. The owner of the land did not create the external factors that 
increased the rental value of the site, so why should he benefit from the increase in 
value brought about by those factors?’’ (2006:2). Henry George believed that land tax 
would prevent land speculation and guide land owners to use their land in most efficient 
way. In addition to this, he focused on revenue of land value taxation and he believed 
that after land value tax there is no need for other taxes (Lawrence; 2006:2-3). Milton 
Friedman stated that ‘‘In my opinion, the least bad tax is the property tax on the 
unimproved value of land, the Henry George argument of many, many years ago’’ 5. 
In this thesis, we will accept these arguments as the ground work of the study and our 
research will be formed in the context of these arguments. In the light of these 
arguments our major research questions can be defined as: how can we transfer urban 
rent to the public and how can we use Georgist Land Value Taxation in order to reach 
this aim? 
 
1.2. Methodology of the Thesis 
A three-part method will be used in order to attempt to answer the research questions: 
“how to transfer urban rent to the public’’ and ‘‘how can Georgist Land Value Taxation 
can be used in order to reach this aim’’. The first part will look existing 
                                                           
4 http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/229961/Henry-George accessed 
26.07.2014 
5 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/George.html accessed 02.07.2014 
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implementations in Turkey and compare and balance differing instruments for rent 
creation and distribution. It will look at both proponents and opponents of these 
instruments and compare arguments as to their effectiveness in promoting transferring 
urban rent to the public. The second part will include a proposal land value taxation 
implementation for a selected study area. In the research part of implementation 
exercise the qualitative research methods are used. Interviews were conducted with the 
real estate appraisals. Graphs and tables will be constructed to illustrate taxation, rent 
allocation structures. The third part will use some international examples of land value 
taxation instrument which support transferring urban rent to the public. 
To begin a discussion on how to transfer urban rent to the public we first need to define 
what we mean by rent and later rent transferring instruments. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we will inquire how production of urban land, urbanization and urban 
rent relate each other. First of all, land rent concept, production of urban land, increase 
in value in urban land are going to be discussed. Then approaches on the transferring 
urban rent to the public on the axis of land value taxation are going to be introduced. 
This chapter will present the main theoretical and conceptual approaches of the thesis. 
 
2.2. Land Rent Concept 
Before discussing transferring urban rent to the public, it is vital to understand what 
land rent is and how it is created. Absolute and differential rent theories are important in 
explaining ‘occurrence of economic value of land’ and ‘why land value increases so 
fast’. 
According to Ricardo, rent arises from unique characteristic differences among different 
pieces of land such as productivity and proximity to the consumption center. Because 
any value cannot be created without labor, value of land is determined by the value of 
goods produced on it. However the price of a good which is produced on more 
productive soil equals to price of a good which is produced on less productive soil. 
Products which are produced in more productive soil provide a surplus value. This 
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surplus value is the source of rent which is called 'differential rent' in theory (Tekeli; 
2009:19). 
According to this theory, as population increases and economy improves, the rent will 
be increased. This is because rational people will first use more productive lands before. 
Than as a result of increasing demand they will start to use less productive lands. So, 
market prices of these products and rent of landowners who have productive lands will 
increase (Tekeli; 2009:20). 
Tekeli stated that the 'absolute rent' is the main subject that Marx focuses on. The reason 
behind the rise of absolute rent is private ownership. This ownership is monopolistic 
inevitably because the supply of land cannot be increased by human endeavor. If supply 
of any commodity decreases, then price of that commodity starts to increase. After that, 
as a result of production becoming more profitable, other entrepreneurs enter the market 
and competition leads to equilibrium price levels. However, supply of land does not 
increase so property rights on it acquires the monopolistic feature. This is the source of 
absolute rent. Landowners have possibility to slow down technical process in 
agriculture and so they have ability to provide a residual value above average profit in 
the industry thanks to monopoly on land. In this way, they change income distribution 
against employees and slow down progress in society. Tekeli stated that, for this reason, 
even in the capitalist system nationalization of land is necessary and this is rational. In 
this way, absolute rent will disappear and only differential rents will remain. Then, there 
will be possibility to allocate the land to the most efficient uses as consistent with 
capitalist purposes (Tekeli; 2009:20).  
 
2.3. Production of Urban Land  
In this part we will focus on how city grows. We will explain the levels of conversion 
fields into urban land. In addition to growth of city, urban transformation which is 
another determining factor in production of urban land will be explained. 
 
 
9 
 
2.3.1. Urbanization, Production of New Urban Land and Precipitating the 
Floating Value 
As stated in the report of the Chamber of Architects, value in urban land is born as a 
result of economic and social activities which are organized in the city and also around 
the city. In countries where agricultural population growth is bigger than job 
opportunities created in agriculture, there is great pressure to flow from rural areas to 
cities. The population pressure concentrated around cities inevitably raises shelter, 
schools, hospitals, parks, roads, water, electricity, sewerage needs and demand. Because 
all of these require the use of the land, high and growing demand for urban land 
emerges. New comers cause an increase in the total value of urban land. This value is 
called floating value because, until the determination of where new arrivals is settled, 
this value is floating and it is unclear where it crashes. This value collapsing as the 
increase in land prices in some parts of the city with settling of the newcomers.  Urban 
plans are being as an instrument to precipitate of floating value. As a result of this, 
urban plans determine which private ownership take the this floating value (Mimarlar 
Odası Ankara Şubesi XIV.Dönem Yönetim Kurulu;Kent Toprakları Sorunu:57). 
 
2.3.2. Increase in Value of Urban Land in Time and Land Speculation 
According to the report of Chamber of Architects, an agricultural land near to the city 
gains value when the city grows. At first, land which has agricultural land use value 
gains extra value with this growth. Then, planning of this land will cause a rise in value 
again.  Land could be ready for urban usage after urban infrastructure is prepared. This 
preparation also allows for an increase in value. Lastly, with starting of the construction 
activities, land value increases rapidly. As a result of pressure of urban growth, density 
(permitted by the development plan) will be increased or new land use types will be 
allowed in urban plans. This leads to a significant increase in value again. So, there is 
no possibility to lose the value of urban land which is bought. As a result of this, people 
will hold land which is bought cheaply. They will sell after it gains high value and make 
land speculation. Land speculation arises from the fact that land is an unmovable 
resource and private ownership is allowed on these resources. Urban land owner gains 
rent without any addition to welfare of society, without any risk, without any effort 
10 
 
(Mimarlar Odası Ankara Şubesi XIV.Dönem Yönetim Kurulu;Kent Toprakları 
Sorunu:57-58).  
  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Increase in Land Value of an Agricultural Land 
Source: translated from,  ‘Kent Toprakları Sorunu’ , Mimarlar Odası Ankara Şubesi 
XIV.Dönem, pp.57 
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2.3.3. A New Urban Land Production Approach: Urban Transformation 
There is a relatively new type of production (in fact reproduction) of urban land which 
mostly depends on commodification of land. After deindustrialization process in 
Turkey, big capital groups mostly shifted to the other profitable fields such as 
construction sector. Related to this issue, parts of the city where slum populations (who 
were working mostly in industrial sector) live became valuable. According to Sönmez, 
big capital did not bother about that these people came from rural and occupied urban 
land because this situation was solving housing issue of workers and their wages would 
be lower. Thus, there was integration between industrialization and squatters in that 
period. Governments tolerated this situation with fear of vote. On the other hand, this 
process was reversed after 80. Big capital who took the most profitable privatization 
tenders came to the point to integrate İstanbul to the world economy as a global city. 
Istanbul began to be transformed to a city which specialized in services, finance, 
tourism and culture -media industry. At this point, places in city center which were 
occupied by old industrial workers gained value quickly. Under the name of urban 
transformation, evacuation of these residents came up to the agenda. With gentrification 
processes, there was planned to build luxury houses and sites. There opened a way for 
commodification urban land and obtain large accumulations and today we continue on 
this path (Sönmez6,2010). Consequently, today, urban transformation can be interpreted 
as a new way to reproduct urban land and there are various instruments rather than 
rehabilitation of slum areas. One of these instruments is ‘transformation of areas which 
have disaster risk into safe living environments’ and the other one is to ‘present a 
speculative project’. Today, reproduction of urban land can be experienced in every part 
of city with these new instruments and legal arrangements as i will explain in following 
chapters. 
 
2.4. Theoretical Approaches on the Transferring Urban Rent to the Public 
In this part of the study various views on Land Value Taxation will be presented which 
will form the basis for our following discussions.  
 
                                                           
6 http://mustafasonmez.net/?p=218 accessed 09.08.2014 
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2.4.1. Henry George 
There is an important theorem that advocates urban rent as a tax base which is called the 
Henry George Theorem. According to Henry George, who is a 19th century political 
economist, ‘‘the value of land in a city is a function of the public investment in that 
city's infrastructure. Under certain ideal conditions, aggregate spending by government 
will be equal to aggregate land rent; thus, 100% of a city's revenue needs could be 
provided by a levy on its land rent’’ 7. 
Shoup specifies that (by giving reference to the book of Henry George which is called 
‘Progress and Poverty8’) taxes on land are naturally ordained sources of state income. 
There are two reasons of this situation. First, the increase in land value is a product of 
all community instead of individuals. George’s second reason is that taxes on land do 
not have any negative effect in terms of investment. It does not discourage construction 
and maintenance of buildings such as taxes on buildings. George claims that land tax 
encourage economic growth and diminish amount of other taxes by replacing other 
taxes in the economy. Moreover importantly, he supports that ‘‘this shift in taxation 
would produce progress without poverty’’ (Shoup; 2004:760). 
There are some studies which enlighten Henry George Rule from point of view of local 
governments with explaining how this rule is important for economy of a city and how 
individuals benefit from public investments. According to ‘A Rule called George: 
Fixing the Property Tax System’ study of  Robinson, Henry George Rule is important in 
terms of functioning local governments because local governments want to raise 
property values. As a result of this value depends on what community does, local 
governments perform their tasks in order to contribute to this value by providing public 
goods. At this point Robinson emphasized that the value of land contains both ‘price’ 
and ‘value of future taxes’. He counted taxes as a part of land value because he thought 
that ‘‘the cost of using a piece of land has two parts-the price of land PLUS tax bill’’. 
Therefore, he advocated that benefits at least should be equal to the ‘price PLUS taxes’ 
in order to make an investment. For him, this cost benefit analysis become a simple rule 
for the city council and they could approve any project ‘‘if it increases the value of land 
and future taxes by more than it costs’’. However, he stated that this is difficult to 
                                                           
7 http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem42.htm accessed 02.07.2011 
8First Pub. Date 1879 http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/George/grgPP.html 
accessed 26.07.2014 
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implement in practice because city councils couldn’t afford to realize every project 
which is supported by this rule. He said that ‘‘the nature of property taxes gets in the 
way. Increases in the market price of the land go to the owners. Property owners collect 
the benefits that city council pays for’’(Robinson9,2002).. All these explanations of 
Robinson, pointed out that land value taxation system was came to the agenda as a 
solution to problem of benefiting only land owners from increases in land value. 
 
2.4.2. Adam Smith 
Adam Smith is social philosopher and political economist who lived between the years 
1723-179010. ‘‘A century before Henry George began writing, Adam Smith also 
endorsed land value taxation in The Wealth of Nations11’’ (Shoup;2004:760).  He stated 
the following in his book, ‘‘Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than 
the rent of houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It would 
fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and 
exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground. More or less can be 
got for it according as the competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to 
gratify their fancy for a particular spot of ground at a greater or smaller expense. In 
every country the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there 
accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of those 
competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they would 
not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the ground. Whether the tax was to 
be advanced by the inhabitant, or by the owner of the ground, would be of little 
importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would 
incline to pay for the ground; so that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether 
upon the owner of the ground-rent 12’’. It can be seen that, Smith pointed out benefits of 
                                                           
9 http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/robinson-david_a-rule-called-george-fixing-
the-property-tax-system-2002.html accessed 09.08.2014 
10 http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/549630/Adam-Smith  
accessed 29.07.2014 
11 First Pub. Date 1776 http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html  
accessed 29.07.2014 
12http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/07/05/749996/-Why-Land-Value-Taxes-Should-
be-Implemented accessed 15.07.2014 
14 
 
Land Value Taxation such as lowering house prices, burdening taxes on owners, 
discouraging to invest on land.  
When Butler’s (who is an economist and director of Adam Smith Institute13 ) 
condensation of Adam Smith’s arguments is examined, it can be seen that they are 
parallel with Henry George’s argument. He has included in his book ‘The Condensed 
Wealth of Nations’ following opinions of Smith: ‘‘Taxes on the produce of land, such 
as tithes, are very unfair. They fall harder on those who own and farm less productive 
land. And they discourage landlords from improving their land, or farmers from 
investing in better cultivation, when the church or state shares none of the expense but 
takes part of the profit’’. Therefore, he advocates dividing house rents into building rent 
and ground rent. Similar to Henry George, he thinks that taxes on ground rent would not 
discourage improvement and building (Butler; 2011:71-72). 
 
2.4.3. William Vickrey  
William Vickrey is another important economist who studied on taxation and tax policy. 
Dye and England reviewed his views as in follows: ‘‘The comments of William Vickrey 
(1999), recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics, point to a superior version of 
property taxation: The property tax is, economically speaking, a combination of one of 
the worst taxes—the part that is assessed on real estate improvements . . . and one of the 
best taxes—the tax on land or site value. Vickrey’s remark emphasizes that the 
traditional property tax is actually two distinct taxes bundled into one annual tax bill. 
One portion is a levy on the assessed value of a parcel of land, and the other is a levy on 
the assessed value of any structures or other improvements on that parcel. Although the 
traditional property tax applies the same tax (or millage) rate to both components, this 
ratio could be changed (Dye and Enland; 2010:6).’’ 
Vickrey also underlined fairness characteristic of Land Value Taxation with saying that: 
“It (land value taxation) guarantees that no one dispossesses fellow citizens by 
obtaining a disproportionate share of what nature provides for humanity (Wuensch and 
Kelly and Hamilton; 2000:1).” With this comment he focused on some basic premises 
                                                           
13 http://eamonnbutler.com/ accessed 26.07.2014 
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of land value taxation which advocates that private ownership should be prevented and 
land is common creation of all people. 
 
2.4.4. Assessment of Arguments and Criticisms 
According to George, Smith and Vickrey, Land Value Taxation has the potential to 
solve land speculation problem. It could prevent certain class from appropriating the 
urban rent. Moreover, they focused on other benefits of Land Value Taxation such that 
it encourages development and economic growth, decrease house prices and amount of 
other taxes, transfer the tax burden to the land owner. 
Besides George’s, Smith’s and Vickrey’s arguments which are parallel with each other, 
there are also some criticisms about their opinion and Land Value Taxation. One of the 
popular criticisms for George focused on his view that private ownership is the only 
source of poverty and interrupted depressions (Blaug; 2000:279). In addition to this, 
there are some criticisms about the difficulty of valuation of land. It is widely believed 
that valuation issue is vulnerable for corruption. People could want to show low of their 
estate’s value in order to pay less tax. 
According to Robinson, Henry George has two important problems. One of them is 
‘‘almost no one knows about the rules’’. The second problem is that ‘‘existing tax laws 
are set up a different way’’. For instance ‘‘Property taxes are charged on buildings as 
well as land, property taxes are set to cover services like water or garbage collection 
that are not part of the property value, property taxes are used to pay for services that 
are not related to property value’’ (Robinson14, 2002). 
Also the Marxists do not agree with Georgist arguments which claim that ‘‘existing 
taxation should be replaced by Land Value Taxation’’. Latham stated that Marx’s views 
on George are related with his theory of rent. He said that rent (by giving reference to 
Matthew Edel) ‘‘is a deduction from surplus value received by the capitalists. In a 
capitalist system, the landlord does not receive earnings directly from the purchase of 
labour power and the sale of his product. He does not thus directly benefit from the 
                                                           
14
 http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/robinson-david_a-rule-called-george-fixing-
the-property-tax-system-2002.html accessed 09.08.2014 
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creation of new value by labour! But by owning the land necessary for production, the 
landlord can obtain funds in return for its use (Latham; 2011:94)’’. 
Moreover Hartwich emphasized several shortcomings of Land Value Taxation in his 
study ‘Taxing Land Value is Another Questionable Tax’. According to Hartwich, 
landowner is an entrepreneur similar to investors in other markets. Therefore, in natural 
landowner holds land with taking into consideration various risks until the time when 
most efficient land use come. He claimed that land value taxation implementation will 
create a distortion in the market as a result landowners cannot make independent 
decisions anymore and said that ‘‘Like any other investor they have to allocate scarce 
resources over time and ultimately direct them to their most productive uses. To take 
this role from them by means of taxing the value of their property means creating a 
distortion in the market as landowners would be unable to make independent decisions 
about their property.It resembles a kind of central planning in the land market’’. He 
advocated that landowners should be treated as other investors who have other types of 
capital (Hartwich;2006:62). 
Furthermore, he criticized land value taxation in terms of moral complication. He stated 
that, according to supporters of LVT, the tax should be taken on intrinsic value of site 
but this value is not independent from changes in the surrounding plots. Therefore, he 
mentioned this taxation system is not fair. He gave some examples such that ‘‘If your 
neighbour builds a polluting factory, your land value and thus your LVT will fall. If 
your neighbour, however, opens a theme park or if a new tube line stops in front of your 
door, your land value will increase and with it the tax you would have to pay on 
it’’(Hartwich;2006:62).  
Additionally, he gave an example such that ‘‘Two landowners may have equally sized 
plots of land in similar locations, but one of them may have a big, luxurious house 
whereas the other one only lives in a small cottage. One may have a high income, 
whereas the other one lives on a small pension. Yet when it comes to paying their LVT 
both would be assessed on the value of the land alone, regardless of real estate values or 
income’’ and took attention to the issue that this taxation may penalize poor people 
(Hartwich;2006:63). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
3. HOW AGENDA CHANGED IN TURKEY & PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Nowadays, when we look at interventions made under city planning profession, we can 
see that the agenda has changed compared to the past. Accordingly, we can say that new 
policies are needed.  
In the past, increases in land value occurred as a natural consequence of growth of city 
or planning interventions such as planning an unplanned space, ensuring elimination of 
deficiencies in public areas and rehabilitation of the traffic flow which may be claimed 
to be beneficial to the public. Increase in value related to these reconstruction 
movements was able to transfer to the public by Arrangement Partnership Interest 
(common use reserve from redivision-DOP15) cuts based on the Article 1816 of Law on 
Land Development Planning and Control and this betterment tax was enough for 
ensuring the public's benefit from the value created. Beside the betterment tax, there 
was de facto and relatively fair rent sharing among actors when compared with today. 
As stated by Tekeli: Prior to January 24 1980, urban rents were divided more equally. 
Old land owners take share from this rent with delegating their share to the 'yap-satçı 17' 
in return for a flat for land basis. Bureaucrats in the city were providing share from the 
                                                           
15 In Turkish ‘Düzenleme Ortaklık Payı’ 
16 Related section of article 18 : During the distribution of land and landlots arranged by 
municipalities or governorships, sufficient area may be deducted as “common use 
reserve from redivision” their acreage in return for the increase in value due to the 
arrangement. However such common use reserve from redivision pursuant to this 
Article may not exceed 40% of the acreage of the land and landlots before the 
arrangement. 
http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/Laws/Law3194_LandDevelopmentPlanningandControl_20
10-12-31_EN_rev01.pdf accessed 27.07.2014 
17
 'yap satçı' refers to small scale unorganized building developer 
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rent with established housing cooperatives. Many small entrepreneurs or 'yap-satçı' was 
doing a pre-deposition18 with this way. Small producers were taking advantage with 
industrial sites. Industrialist who established the factory in a large plot outside the city 
was using of increasing value of his property to receive loan. Old slum owners were 
selling slum lands to new comers and benefiting from the rent (Tekeli; 2009:92). 
When we examine the process from economical perspective, we see that as mentioned 
by Tekeli: Big capital environment was left urban rent to small entrepreneurs and old 
property owners and they were taking rent of industrialization in protected domestic 
market with a monopolistic structure and through import substitution. As a result of 
these monopoly rents they do not need to land rents. There began to be a change in the 
division of labor in Özal economy period. Tendency of getting share from urban rents of 
big capital increased. They started to enter to this field even though not all of them were 
successful. On the one hand, Özal Government took measures to support big capital 
groups such as Mass Housing Act. On the other hand, Turkey started to experience 
deindustrialization process. Therefore, this area became attractive for big capital. 
Certainly, emergence of this trend did not remove using urban rent as a tool for political 
support because Özal used this facility with slum amnesty (Tekeli; 2009:92-93). 
Over time, organized capitalist developers took place of unorganized capitalist 
developers. 'Urban renewal projects',' mega-projects', 'crazy projects' have taken the 
place of transformation based on parcels and then the agenda began to change in urban 
planning. With these improvements increase in land value as a result of urban 
interventions reached considerable amounts such that Arrangement Partnership Interest 
(DOP) cuts cannot be seen satisfactory for transferring urban rent to the public. In this 
process actors were also changed and large real estate investment firms took 
contractors’ place. City planning became more politicized. Politicians and investors 
gain political and monetary interest from these processes. On the other hand, poor local 
people have been suffering from existing policies and some land owners becoming rich. 
These processes cause increase in income inequality. Today, change of urban fabric in 
other words rent creation has three basic covers: the first of is ‘rehabilitation of slum 
areas’ , the second is ‘transformation of areas which have disaster risk into safe living 
environments’ and the third one is to  ‘present a speculative project’. On the other hand, 
                                                           
18 In Turkish ‘ön birikim’ 
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professional organizations and NGO's such as Chamber of City Planners or 
Architectures defend that most of these interventions and their legal basis are not 
concerned with rehabilitation of urban areas and focused on rent creation. In this 
chapter of the thesis how the agenda changed in Turkey for rent creation and 
distribution process will be examined in relation to legislative and institutional 
processes. Then, in the context of a new policy proposal Land Value Taxation will be 
presented as a policy tool in the following chapter. 
 
3.1. Legislative and Institutional Process (Development of Current Policies) 
As we examined above, depending on the impact of neoliberal policies, urbanization 
processes and legal structure of these processes were changed. With this part of the 
study, we will understand that how planning institution was made an inefficient actor 
with these legislative and institutional processes.  
 
3.1.1. Urbanization in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era and Effects to Urban 
Planning & Urban Transformation 
In this section, we will examine the effects of neoliberal policies on the urban land 
policy of Turkey. With 1961 Constitution, Turkey started to follow a similar approach 
to welfare state principles but then in 1980’s there became a change in economic 
policies. These economic changes which were related mostly towards market oriented 
policies became a breaking point in the urbanization process of Turkey.  
Neoliberal policies has brought ‘urban rent’ concept to the agenda of the market. As I 
tried to explain in agenda setting part, related to deindustrialization process in the world 
economic system, big capital showed a trend  to get share urban rent. As a result of this, 
urban areas have started to become an important commodity for the market. 
Economically or politically powerful parts of society have tried to make profit from 
urban areas. Beside this, some parts of society have found themselves in this profit 
making process and suffered.  
Today, for some parts of society urban rent is a source of ‘economic profit’ and for 
other parts ‘political profit’. Even though there are some parts who are in outside this 
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profit making process or suffering, most part of society tries to reach their own aim by 
using urban land. In order to realize their goal, bureaucratic politics and urban planning 
professions are used as a tool.  This tool can be in various guises. Most important of 
them are urban planning decisions and urban transformation implementations.  
People who see urban areas as a commodity don’t bother about public spaces or housing 
for the poor. They only care about how to attract new investments which are interested 
in richer part of society. Özdemir and Eraydın explained this process as follows: 
‘‘Neoliberal urbanization as the consequence of neoliberal forms of urban policy, 
transforms the built environment and the urban form in its own way by eliminating or 
keeping the urban public spaces under intensified surveillance and creating new 
privatized spaces of elite/corporate consumption. It enforces the destruction of the 
degraded residential neighborhoods of low-income groups who formerly constituted the 
traditional working-class, for speculative redevelopment and constructing large-scale 
mega projects to attract corporate investment reconfiguring the existing land-use 
patterns, creating gated communities, urban enclaves and other purified spaces 
(Özdemir and Eraydın;2012:2)’’.  As Özdemir and Eraydın stated, neoliberalism tries to 
change cities in manner which it wants through the urban transformation process. In 
addition this transformation targets low income groups’ residential areas which cause 
gentrification.  
During these processes government and private sector gain jointly. On the one hand 
governments try to trigger market and create employment through the construction 
market mostly as a result of electoral concerns, on the other hand private sector tries to 
maximize their profit. Low income local people become victims of this process which is 
profitable for governments and the private sector but not for them. ‘‘An extensive part 
of the neoliberal policies are today made of urban policies, which boost the private 
sector, construction, finance and tourism sectors being the leading ones. These 
neoliberal policies aim to eliminate all kinds of barriers against the construction firms 
involved in the urban transformation projects, pass the needed laws and regulations as 
soon as possible, and change the zoning status of areas where previously no 
development was allowed to facilitate the operation of  the construction sector (Özdemir 
and Eraydın;2012:3)’’. In this process, obstacles of neoliberalism such as law or 
disputes in urban plans are solved by central and local governments. 
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Ways to deal with these obstacles will be examined in detail in the section on legal 
regulations. It will be discussed how new enacted laws related to urban planning make it 
easier to reach the goal of neoliberalism. 
 
3.1.2. Legal Regulations 
State is major actor who plays a role to give a shape to physical environment. Yılmaz 
has addressed this issue and pointed out to the importance of state interventions which 
cause spatial changes. For him, private real estate market is not qualified enough to 
create rent. State should prepare required environment to invest (2011:28). One 
dimension of preparing this environment is to enact necessary laws. There are some 
important laws which are directly related to production of rent with urban planning and 
transformation processes. These laws can be interpreted as making necessary changes in 
the legal to realize the maximizing profit aims of neoliberal policies on urban land. 
The parallel problem with these laws is that huge authority is given to the public 
administrations. For instance, state can declare any place as urban transformation area 
with this huge authority. In a country like Turkey which professions’ recommendations 
are not taken into consideration enough by politicians, this authority problem is 
dangerous. Because, city planning interventions are interventions to lives of people and 
people can suffer from results of these interventions over years. 
 
3.1.2.1. Slum Relief Laws  
As a result of populist approaches of multi-party politics, politicians saw slums as vote 
sources. They offered title deeds and infrastructure as election promises. Accordingly, 
they enacted first Slum Relief Law in 1966 (Adaman and Keyder;2005: vi). Thanks to 
this law illegal housings gain legal status and had the necessary infrastructure. 
According to Eke, slums have been a rent-seeking method for illegal agents with 
abusing supply/demand balance in housing market, occupying public lands then selling 
them. This is because governments who could not cope with migration from rural to 
urban and provide necessary auditing for shanty settlements. Therefore, in addition to 
being low income housing slums have become neighborhoods that people who have 
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more than one building gain illegal income (Eke; 2000:44). As a result of slum reliefs, 
public lands are opened to private ownership and urban rents are created. Urban land 
and building speculation became investment area of commercial bourgeoisie who 
increase their capital (Akın; 2007:266). Besides commercial bourgeoisie, these 
transformation processes are seen as an opportunity also by property owners. Slum 
populations in cities are transforming entrepreneur individuals who want to get a share 
of the pie (Şengül19).  
 
3.1.2.2. Law No 5393, Municipality Law Article No 73, Urbanization and 
Development Areas 
According to this law: ‘‘The municipality, may adopt urbanization and development 
projects in order to re-construct and restore the ruined parts of the city; to create housing 
areas, industrial and commercial zones, technology parks and social facilities; to take 
measures against the earthquake risk or to protect the historical and cultural structure of 
the city 20’’. 
The problem with this law is that authorities can determine anywhere as urban 
transformation area without any limitations. This law was the first step in giving 
excessive authority to the state.  
 
3.1.2.3. Law No. 5366, Preservation by Renovation and Utilization by 
Revitalizing of Deteriorated Immovable Historical and Cultural Properties  
According to this law, areas can be declared as Urban Renewal Areas by the Renewal 
Council and following it renewal projects started especially in İstanbul such as 
Sulukule, Tarlabaşı, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray and Süleymaniye districts. Today, an 
important part of urban renewal areas includes the historic neighborhoods in the city 
                                                           
19http://www.evrensel.net/haber/74227/kentsel-donusumu-dogru-
anlamak.html#.U7RB1o1rPIU accessed 02.07.2014 
20www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/Avrupa-Birligi/Documents/E7518L5393.doc 
accessed 02.07.2014 
23 
 
centers. Despite becoming Conservation Site21(protected area), having original 
architectural and cultural pattern, interest groups often see these areas as the source of 
rent as a result of their locations. In addition to creating investment areas by 
demolishing historical pattern, local people are displaced. 
Tarlabaşı Renewal Projects is one of the worst projects which people suffer. Lewis and 
Letsch stated the problems with law in their blog as that 22: ‘‘it enables local authorities 
to expropriate property in dilapidated areas in order to implement renewal projects 
without the consent of the house owners. On the other hand, it gives municipalities the 
power to suspend and overrule decisions by the Council for Preservation of Sites of 
Historic Interest to declare a certain area a Conservation Site as has happened in 
Tarlabaşı. The potential impact of a Renewal Council ruling has sparked concern with 
UNESCO – in a report published by an UNESCO commission the inspectors indicated 
that Law No. 5366 did not support preservation, but rather cleared the way for the 
demolition and the destruction of historic buildings. UNESCO suggested an amendment 
of the law in order for Turkey to adequately protect its historical sites.’’ 
Again there can easily be observed an authority problem with this law. Areas can be 
identified for renewal projects without the consent of house owners. Also, local 
administrations have more authority on conservation and historic sites ironically rather 
than professions. 
 
3.1.2.4. Law No 6306, Disaster Law 
It is obvious that big part of Turkey’s land is under earthquake risk and so measures to 
deal with this risk and with reconstruction efforts are necessary. According to this law 
cities may be saved from this disaster by renewal projects in risky areas. The problem is 
that the law seems to serve mostly developers’ interests: ‘‘through expropriation and 
                                                           
21 ‘Conservation Site’ refers to ‘Sit Alanı’ in Turkish. According to Article 3 of Law No 
2863: "Conservation site" shall becities and remains of cities that are product of various 
prehistoric to present civilizations that reflect the social, economic, architectural a.s. 
characteristics of the respective period, areas that have been stages of social life or 
important historical events with a concentration of cultural property and areas the 
natural characteristics of which have been documented to require protection. 
http://www.kulturvarliklari.gov.tr/TR,43249/law-on-the-conservation-of-cultural-and-
natural-propert-.html accessed 27.07.2014 
22 http://www.tarlabasiistanbul.com/glossary/ accessed 02.07.2014 
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forced evictions, some prestigious places become available for investments and 
regeneration. Construction companies and firms will be very benefited by this law. 
Moreover, these evictions might affect not only middle income people but also the most 
vulnerable groups 23’’. 
After laws mentioned above, disaster law proves huge authority of state on people’s 
sheltering right. Government can declare anywhere urban transformation area. This law 
is interpreted as legitimization of urban transformation processes by disaster. Tekeli 
stated that urban transformation projects are politicized. Earthquake risky areas and 
slum areas are tried to be transformed. So over a year from 350 to 400 thousand 
additional housing demand is wanted to be created and falling into a economic crisis is 
to be prevented. If there is a risky building, the first that should come to mind is to 
strengthen it with a cheap way. However this law is trying to demolish all buildings 
even if they are healthy. There is another critique which shows there is no legitimacy 
base. The number of housing which is said to be demolished under this law is around 7 
million. On the other hand according to earthquake engineers this number is 7 thousand 
(Tekeli24). This huge difference shows that there will be lots of people who will lose 
their houses despite of not having any earthquake risk. Also lots of urban lands will be 
produced in order to construct new building projects. This will give rise to economic 
activity and employment will be created but at the expense of substantial human 
suffering. 
 
3.1.2.5. Changes on Authority of Mass Housing Administration (TOKI) with 
Various Laws 
In addition to above legislations, Mass Housing Administration, which was established 
with 2985 The Housing Act in 1984, had various important changes after 2002 which 
are important in terms of rent creation. 
At first, TOKI’s mission was to product house for low income people but then it started 
to build various projects for low / medium / high income groups. In the report of 
Chamber of Civil Engineers the transition period stated as in follows: legal arranging 
                                                           
23 http://direitoamoradia.org/?p=13059&lang=en accessed 02.07.2014 
24http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/146926-afet-yasasi-tapuyu-deldi  
accessed 02.07.2014 
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about operating principles, determining (in fact extending) powers and responsibilities 
of TOKI were carried out in this period. Mission fields of TOKI extended from tourism, 
small industrial enterprises to health and education with the 'Regulation Related to 
Usage of Resources of Mass Housing Administration 25' in 2002. In addition to this, 
TOKI is given the rights such as establishing companies for housing sector /becoming 
partner to companies /making housing projects in domestic or abroad / developing 
profitable projects in order to ensure source. Furthermore, duties and obligations of 
General Directorate of Land Office were given to TOKI by law 5273 in 2004. TOKI 
now became a gigantic company which use public resources, make investments in 
almost every field. It became an enterprising public institution at a time which public 
sector is removed from economic activities. It has opened a special place for itself in 
merchant-state relation.  The legal process which provides to keep TOKI outside public 
control is started with closure 'Mass Housing Undersecretariat26' and 'General 
Directorate of Land Office27’. This process continued with removing TOKI from the 
scope of Public Procurement Act. Lastly, TOKI has removed from the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Auditors and there has been left only State Supervisory Board. Then, TOKI 
began to live its golden age with 'urban transformation projects'. TOKI extended its 
authority with the delegation ' making expropriation and development plan during slum 
transformation applications' with the law 5162 in 2004. Then, its powers have expanded 
with the law 5366. Moreover, all powers of Ministry of Public Works and Settlement in 
slum areas released to TOKI in 2007 with the law 5069. In addition all these privileges, 
TOKI gained the power which allows taking Treasury lands without any payment with 
offering of related Minister & Finance Minister and approval of Prime Minister 
(Chamber of Civil Engineers TOKI Report; 2009:42). 
 
3.1.2.6. Assessment of Legal Regulations  
When legal regulations are assessed in general perspective, it can be said that all of 
them make easier of state intervention during rent creation process. It is remarkable that, 
most of these regulations were accepted after 2002 which is the year AKP government 
came to the power. So, these regulations can be interpreted as an indicator for rent 
                                                           
25 In Turkish ‘Toplu Konut İdaresi Kaynaklarının Kullanım Şekline İlişkin Yonetmelik’ 
26 In Turkish ‘Toplu Konut Musteşarlığı’ 
27 In Turkish ‘Arsa Ofisi Genel Mudurluğu’ 
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creation behavior of AKP government. The reason behind of this behavior could be 
associated with that the government follows growth basis economy policy and one of 
the dynamos of this policy is construction sector. There are some criticisms which claim 
that the time earlier than 2002 was better in terms of social justice. For instance, Article 
73 of  Municipality Law (which is one of the most criticized law) is interpreted as 
follows: ‘‘this is a legal arrangement that makes local people living in squatter areas 
displaced, creates rent and leaves public and society out of rent distribution’’ 
(Yılmaz;2011:45).  
In this section of the study, legal changes emerged in the neoliberal era of Turkey’s 
urbanization were discussed. In the following part, we will explain the rent creation 
implementations/instruments which are mostly related discussed legal regulations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
4. EXISTING RENT CREATION IMPLEMENTATIONS AND ROLE OF 
ACTORS IN TURKEY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this part of the thesis, question of ‘how the urban rent is created’ will be explained. In 
this context, separation between ‘spontaneously rent creation as a natural result of urban 
growth’ and ‘instruments of current urban land policy of Turkey which focuses on rent 
creation’ will be investigated. For instance ‘gaining rent with proximity to the city 
center is a natural result of growing of the city. On the other hand ‘speculative projects’ 
are generally functioning as instruments which serve for current rent creation focused 
policies. Furthermore, intention of some interventions such as ‘development plans or 
change in development plans’ cannot be assessed truly and it is difficult to separate 
whether they serve as a rent creation instrument or necessary intervention. 
After rent creation interventions, current roles of different stake holders in rent creation 
from urban land will be discussed. 
 
4.2. Rent Creation Instruments and Processes 
There has been variety of instruments to generate urban rent. Actually all these 
instruments increase the value of surrounding land and lead to buy urban land for 
speculative purposes. These are;  
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*Proximity to city center (CBD) & neighborhood  
Relation between urban rent and distance from center can be explained by bid rent 
theory. ‘‘The theory states that rents are bid upwards close to the city center as 
households attempt to minimize transportation costs. Residents living close to the city 
center have to travel less to get work or entertainment centers, and this decreases 
disutility. Conversely, rents are lower away from the city center because transportation 
costs for residents there are high. Thus, through competition to minimize transportation 
costs, rents become a negative function of distance from the city center (Trussell; 
2010:5)’’. Here the question is ‘How is bid-rent theory related to our subject’. Because 
lands in the city center are scarce, these areas have more tendency to become subject to 
speculation. Monopolistic facilities of these areas such as vicinity to mall/ residences 
and offices could become rent creation tools.  
*Through city development plans (new plans/ plan change/ plan modification) 
Unfortunately, this type rent generation is related generally how politicians use urban 
planning profession as a rent creation tool.  
Generally, there are two main ways to realize this;  
When cadastral land is transformed to planned area through development plans, value is 
created. Even though there are attempts to transfer this created value to the public, these 
attempts are not influential. Related to this produced value, people who are taken 
advantage of new planning regulations have to pay a betterment tax which is named as 
‘share of partnership arrangements’ (DOP28-Düzenleme Ortaklık Payı). According to 
Law No 3194, during expropriations in order to implement urban plans, state can take 
some part of your land at a certain rate without any compensation. This land is taken as 
a result of increase in land value after planning implementations than is used to build 
                                                           
28 According to Article 18 of Law No 3194 : During the distribution of land and landlots 
arranged by municipalities or governorships, sufficient area may be deducted as 
“common use reserve from redivision” their acreage in return for the increase in value 
due to the arrangement. However such common use reserve from redivision pursuant to 
this Article may not exceed 40% of the acreage of the land and landlots before the 
arrangement. 
http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/Laws/Law3194_LandDevelopmentPlanningandControl_20
10-12-31_EN_rev01.pdf accessed 27.07.2014 
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some public spaces such as green areas, schools, roads on it. This rate29 should be 
maximum %40 and these land deductions could be used only for public purposes. 
The problem is that maximum rate of ‘DOP’ is same for all lands, but after some plan 
modifications which includes only few parcels, increase in land value could be too 
much over than taken according to this rate (Kaya:6). At this point, land owner take 
difference and benefit from rent. Another problem is that, DOP can be taken just for one 
time. If there is a second planning regulation on land, state cannot take DOP again. 
Construction rights can be increased with further changes in plans independently of 
earlier decisions or land use functions can be changed. For example, if a housing area 
becomes a commercial area or if construction rights increase from 3 flats to 6 flats, land 
value increases. These are some methods to create rent with changes on some parcels in 
urban plans. In order to avoid these, recently some changes are planning to be made in 
3194 Law about DOP. According to these changes rate of DOP will increase to %45 
and DOP can be taken more than one time (Güney30). This change in regulation may 
prevent plan modifications carried out for the sole purpose of creating rent.  
In addition to these, there may be some infrastructural investments which were decided 
in urban plans like a new railway. These kinds of investments also lead to increase in 
land value but the important question here is whether these projects done for public 
benefit or land speculation. 
                                                           
29 Rate is determined in Law No 5006 
 
30http://yenidonem.com.tr/yeni-imar-yasa-taslaginda-bedelsiz-terk-dop-artiyor.html 
accessed 02.07.2014 
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If changes in urban plans will be done for the public benefit, then there is no ethical 
problem but if changes will be done for benefit of certain groups, this is a big problem 
in terms of moral hazard. In Turkey most changes are clearly done for the second 
purpose. During the decision making process scientific information31 is ignored and the 
people in profession are excluded as a result of the pressure of the central authority over 
the local authorities. In many contexts politicians interfere with the technical area, take 
important decisions by themselves pretending as if they had left that area for city 
planners. However, they see them as technicians who draw plans rather than city 
                                                           
31 ‘Scientific information’ concept is widely used in urban planning literature. It refers 
to urban planning principles which are based on scientific methods. 
Figure 4.1. Effect of Infrastructural Investments 
Source: http://www.andywightman.com/docs/LVTREPORT.pdf 
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planners (Şengül; 2007:85). Third Bridge Project can be given as an example to these 
processes. This project was started to be constructed contrary to the 1/100.000 scaled 
İstanbul Environmental Plan32 study. A transportation decision which is not included in 
this plan which is known as the constitution of İstanbul was implemented in a ‘top-
down’ manner. At this point the ‘scientific information’ that we mentioned above is not 
taken into account. All of these applications are harmful to objectivity of decisions and 
scientific aspect of the profession. 
*Urban Transformation Projects  
‘‘At the 1st International Seminar on Urban transformation held in Den Hang in August, 
1958, the experts agreed on the fact that the fundamental purpose of urban 
transformation is to change the urban environment on purpose through a planned 
interference and an injection of regeneration in order to address to the needs of urban 
life and work of available areas at present and in the future (Eğercioğlu and Özdemir: 
9).’’ 
Today, urban transformation is one of the ways to create rent by urban planning as 
described in the section on legal regulation above. In the section ‘slum relief law’ we 
see that slum reliefs worked as a social policy as a result of slum dwellers could get 
their title deed and necessary infrastructure. There was a transformation on-settlement. 
Today the transformation process evolved to a more capitalist shape. There is important 
relationship among rent, landed property and capital which can be investigated through 
urban transformation projects as Yılmaz focused on saying: ‘‘Urban renewal project 
areas are the spaces where the state has an active intervention in order to solve the 
contradiction between capital and land-based interest. Intervention of the state converts 
this contradiction and creates the political and ideological struggle formation. 
Consequently, development rights of squatter owners decrease; even, most of the 
squatter owners lose their landownership position. Urban lands and rent is transferred to 
political power and an interest group which is supported by the municipalities (Yılmaz; 
2011:3).’’  
                                                           
32 According to Law No 3194 : “Environmental Plan” is the plan that lays down 
settlement and land use decisions such as housing, industry, agriculture, tourism, 
transportation in compliance with regional and national planning decisions. 
http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/Laws/Law3194_LandDevelopmentPlanningandControl_20
10-12-31_EN_rev01.pdf accessed 27.07.2014 
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As described by Yılmaz, today urban transformation projects are too far from 
functioning as a social policy. However, dwellers in transformation areas lose their land 
owner position as a result of there is no ‘on-settlement transformation’. Interest groups 
prefer to send dwellers to suburbs of the city in order to evaluate transformation areas 
which are located in advantageous positions for more profitable projects. Furthermore, 
urban transformation is seen as a conclusion to problems related with capital 
accumulation and land rent has become an important way to provide capital 
accumulation. 
*Speculative Rent Projects  
Speculative projects could be defined as planning projects which aim to provide rent for 
interest groups rather than providing public welfare. 
Before a speculative project has been announced to public, some interest groups who 
are in close relation with decision makers have known about them and they buy the land 
near project location. After project is explained by media and people being informed, 
interest groups sell these lands too expensively. They obtain an unfair advantage over 
land. 
For example, during AKP government period, there are lots of projects which are 
criticized as the speculative rent projects. Third Bridge, Canal İstanbul and the third 
Airport projects are among the much-criticized by professions, academicians and 
NGOs. Main criticism is that all of these projects violate planning principles and all of 
these projects will bring great rents.  
Here the question could be: ‘how it is known that all of these projects violate planning 
principles’. According to critics, one of the most important principles of urban planning 
is ‘public interest’ concept. All planning applications should be done with taking into 
consideration how life of public can be better than before planning interventions. 
Planning discipline does not aim to produce rent projects and contribute wealth of some 
certain interest groups. Planning discipline aims providing a healthy psychical 
environment, social facilities and so livable happy environments. Analysis made by 
related professional organizations show that none of these projects bother about these 
goals. For that reason, it can be interpreted as these projects are constructed despite the 
public and professions’ objections. For instance third bridge project which is assessed as 
33 
 
a rent creation project is one of the debatable interventions of current government as i 
will discuss in the following parts again. Lots of professional chambers and 
academicians stated that third bridge won’t solve the traffic problem of İstanbul. 
Therefore, city planners did not take into the third bridge to the İstanbul Environmental 
Plan. In addition to traffic problem, there is %34 of private forest area, %46 of forest 
area, % 38 of 2B spaces, %43 of agricultural land locate in impact zone of third bridge 
and its connecting roads (2010:28). These rates indicate that construction of third bridge 
could lead various irreversible environmental problems. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Impact Zone of Third Bridge 
Source: translated from Şehir Plancıları Odası İstanbul Şubesi 3. Köprü Değerlendirme 
Raporu; 2010:29 
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Figure 4.3. Before and After Bridge 
Source: translated from Şehir Plancıları Odası İstanbul Şubesi 3. Köprü Değerlendirme 
Raporu; 2010:8 
As it can be seen from previous bridges which were built, it is probable that areas near 
the third bridge will be opened to construction and North Forests of İstanbul would be 
lost as can be guessed from the photo above. 
 
4.3. Role of Actors  
While examining role of actors we can differentiate between actors who benefit from 
urban rent and those suffer from it. Governments and interest groups meet on same 
profit ground. Unfortunately, local governments and city planners are inactive actors of 
this process as a result of top-down approach policies of government.  In consequence 
of this top down ruling tradition elected persons behave as if they have whole authority 
in an illegitimate manner. Today, in Turkey there is least or no consultation with the 
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lower level of management such as local governments and urban planners. Additionally, 
meetings with local public are inadequate during decision making processes. Most of 
the public, especially poorer parts could not take their right and suffer from this process. 
There is unfair share of authority also land value and rent among included actors.  
After roles of different stakeholders are examined, in the following parts of the thesis i 
will make some proposals with touching on governance concept for a new division of 
labor. 
 
4.3.1. Role of State 
Environment and Urban Ministry or municipalities are main representatives of the 
state’s role as a decision making mechanism. Interventions of these institutions such as 
improvement plans, amnesty laws, and various legal regulations are the most important 
sources of rent creation. Today, there are some criticisms about working of these 
decision making mechanisms like that they ignore public welfare. There are corruption 
criticisms which claim that planning authorities and private actors make common 
interest arrangements without taking into consideration of public welfare.  These kinds 
of criticisms could be an indicator that legal sanctions are not sufficient.  
Bureaucratic ruling tradition of Turkey is another determining factor in role of state. 
One of important problematic side of bureaucracy is that bureaucrats’ position between 
central government and public. There are differences between demands and 
expectations of public and political authority. Bureaucrats have obligation to do what 
government wants but actions that government wants are not always legitimate. 
Referring to the bureaucracy issue, Tekeli pointed out that increase in urban land shows 
'amount of milking land market by private ownership33'. It is clear that how powerful 
will be political power which obtains to get the revealed value. In such a strong political 
pressure, urban planning may be a toy, a sleep tool, a cover (2009:32). Unfortunately, 
today, experiences in Turkey reflect the situation Tekeli told about. 
 
 
                                                           
33  In Turkish ‘özel mülkiyetin ortaya koyacağı yağma miktarı’ 
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4.3.2. Role of Private Sector  
During rent creation processes boundaries of role of private sector are determined by 
state regulations. Unfortunately, as a result of interest relations between state and 
private sector, these boundaries are too flexible. Time to time, legal regulations lose 
their validity in order to protect private sector actors.  Predictably, local public as a 
weak side is suffered from these privileges. 
About actors who have big share on transformation pie, there is a research which is 
called ‘dispossession networks34’. Dispossession networks is mapping and publishing 
study which reveals relations between capital and power. Aim of the study is to make 
these relations visible and therefore arguable. People who work for this research stated 
that while they were mapping they realized that urban transformation projects are made 
by always some certain companies. (Türkkan35).  
 
Figure: 4.4. Dispossession Networks 
Source: http://mulksuzlestirme.org 
                                                           
34  In Turkish ‘mülksüzleştirme ağları’ 
35 http://birgun.net/haber/iste-mulksuzlestirmenin-agi-4889.html accessed 02.07.2014 
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Figure 4.5. Dispossession Networks 
Source: http://mulksuzlestirme.org 
It can be observed above; every time some certain groups take part in these kinds of rent 
projects. There is a complex network among them. These huge capital groups and their 
profit relations with political powers can be interpreted as an obstacle against transition 
urban rent to the public. 
 
4.3.3. Role of Local Public 
In Turkey, local public became a part of rent creation processes after amnesty laws were 
enacted. Thanks to amnesty laws, illegal squatter houses in cities gain legal status and 
legalization of these spaces brought a huge rent together. Yılmaz interpreted 
legalization of squatter houses as ‘‘informally, legalization of squatter houses might be 
considered as an intervention of economic liberalism to cities spatially. Increase of rent 
is aimed for including squatter areas into urban land market and having investments of 
capital in squatter areas (Yılmaz; 2011:51)’’. In addition to amnesty laws, there started 
an improvement plan period for rehabilitation of squatter areas similar to urban 
transformation projects of today. ‘‘Within a short period, the fact that most of these 
plans are realized is an indicator of rent expectations. At the same time, as 
municipalities care for votes of people living there, those plans were implemented 
precipitately (Yılmaz; 2011:53)’’. Public contributed to rent creation with occupying 
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state lands and benefited from the rent taking title deed. Although government aimed 
mostly political rent at those times, today the process evolved to gain more monetary 
rent for organized interest groups as we talked about in role of private sector part. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of participation in the planning application processes, local 
people are not included to these processes as required. While private sector and 
government take the large portion of rent, the local population cannot get the right 
share.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
5. A NEW LAND POLICY PROPOSAL FOR HOW TO TRANSFER URBAN 
RENT TO THE PUBLIC 
 
5.1. Introduction 
After above analysis, it can be interpreted that, there are two main problems with 
current land policy of Turkey. First one is improper rent creation such as land 
speculation. The second is sharing urban rent in unfair manner. Considering these 
problems: 
Land policy of Turkey should be to introduce a new taxation system to transfer urban 
rent to the public and to finance local services. It is believed that this tax reform will 
prevent improper rent creation and be beneficial for future economic improvement of 
Turkey.  
In this part of the study, questions ‘For which rent creation instrument, which 
distribution instrument is suitable’ and ‘why land value taxation could be an alternative 
solution for land private ownership problem and speculative projects in the context of 
transferring urban rent to the public’ will be discussed. Related to first question, 
principal issue to be emphasized is that ‘rent creation instruments do not serve for the 
same purposes in every time’. Therefore, these purposes should be classified 
appropriately in practice and should be matched with suitable rent distribution 
techniques. In this context, various examples and existing rent distribution instruments 
will be examined comparatively. It will be explained that ‘whether matching is possible 
in practice’. For instance, ‘distribution of rent’ from making a development plan in a 
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cadastral area and from constructing a bridge shouldn’t be with same instruments. In the 
first example (development plan) rent creation is the result of an intervention which 
could be for public welfare but the second example is debatable issue in terms of public 
welfare (for Turkish practices).  
The point to be achieved as a result of these discussions is that as stated by Tekeli: 
‘providing urban land is to be used for the benefit of the public’. This is not something 
other than regulation the relationship between individual interest and public welfare 
(Tekeli; 2009:37). In thesis, there will be analyzed various rent distribution instruments 
in order to regulate these relations. Additionally, there will be developed a proposal on 
discussed subject with taking into consideration balance between private and public 
interest.  
 
5.2. Policy Formulation 
This part of study involves analysis and identification of alternatives to solving urban 
rent sharing issues. There are several choices for resolving agenda items. 
 
5.2.1. Alternative Recommendations and Examples for Redistribution of Rent 
This part will focus on different tools to transfer urban rent to the public. Alternatives 
will be analyzed in order to decide the implementation tool of new land policy proposal. 
 
5.2.1.1. Land Value Taxation 
Henry George proposes that there need to be change on system of property taxation. 
‘Property tax’ on land should be increased and tax on improvements depends on 
buildings, infrastructure should be decreased. 
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Figure 5.1. Land Value Taxation 
Source: http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem3.htm 
In the example above, each parcel has a value of $10,000. Conventional tax system 
levies a tax of 3% of the total value of the real estate. Instead of this system it is 
proposed that a levy of 6% on the land value alone with no taxes on improvements such 
as buildings or infrastructure. As a result of each parcel has the same land value, tax 
amounts would be the same ($600). This system can be concluded as ‘‘a tax on land 
value penalizes land speculation and rewards development’’36. 
 
5.2.1.1.1. Taxation Urban Rent in Turkey 
There have been some taxation implementations in Turkey which are not similar to 
Land Value Taxation.  
* Expenditure Shares (Şerefiyeler): Implementation of this tax has been terminated in 
1981 and by law No 2464. Expenditure share was a kind of real estate tax which was 
taken by local governments as a result of increase in the value of assets with urban 
planning implementations, infrastructure services (Ökmen and Yurtsever;2010:68). 
When we compare with Henry George’s proposal, there is no much similarity. This tax 
was taken for ‘improvements’ on land such as buildings or infrastructure. As will be 
remembered, Henry George supported to decrease tax on improvements in his proposal. 
                                                           
36 http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem3.htm accessed 02.07.2014 
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According to some recent news37 this tax will enter into force again. It is stated that the 
tax will be implemented only for lands which are obtained high income as a result of 
extraordinary increase in value. It is also mentioned that taxation will be requested for 
places which have potential to create high rent, developing lands with planning 
decisions, places which have rising real estate values, around projects made by state 
such as bridge, shopping center, and hospital. 
* Property Value Increase Tax: Aim of this tax explained by Ökmen and Yurtsever 
as: in order to decrease attraction of property investments, value differences arising 
from selling buildings and lands will be included for taxation. This tax also was 
repealed in 1982 (Ökmen and Yurtsever; 2010:69). 
* Income Tax Law / Value Increase Income Taxation: According to this law, if 
people sell their real estate before 5 years has passed, this gain will be taxed as value 
increase income taxation (Ökmen and Yurtsever;2010:70). This implementation could 
be successful but the problem is official selling prices do not reflect the actual prices. 
The same problem could also come to the agenda for Land Value Taxation 
implementation. In order to prevent from these kinds of moral hazards, purchasing and 
valuation of real estates should be audited publicly. 
As can be seen from the experiences that we have examined, taxation urban rent in 
Turkey could not prevent land speculation and so has never been reached expected 
level. There are some political and ideological reasons behind this failure but the most 
important reason is lack of a strict legal regulation for taxing land value. 
 
5.2.1.2. Recommendations of İlhan Tekeli  
İlhan Tekeli has two proposals available about realization possibility of urban plans by 
transferring urban rent to the public. The first of them is, trying to transfer urbanization 
rent to the public with making changes in implemented policies, understanding of 
planning (instead of changes in institutional structure). This approach is related with 
converting land which is on the fringes of the city to an urban land with planning, 
bringing infrastructure in order to provide additional values for public administration. 
                                                           
37 http://www.emlakdanismanlari.com/emlak-sektor-haberleri-28/emlak-serefiye-
vergisi-geri-geliyor-1346.html accessed 30.07.2014 
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The other is, limiting control of land owner on urban land with two dimensions and 
bringing new regulations for third dimension rights. According to this proposal, land 
owners can use their land as they want if they don't build on it. But if the soil is 
converted to an urban land by building on it, land owner will purchase building rights 
from the public (Tekeli; 2009:64-65). Thanks to this method, land value increases will 
be transferred to the public substantially.  
 
 
 Figure 5.2. Purchasing Building Rights 
 Source: own design 
Proposal of Tekeli is different from Henry George's proposal, although it seems that this 
proposal can prevent providing unfair rent which is obtained from plan modifications. 
Nowadays, one of the biggest problems of the big cities is segmented planning 
decisions which are taken on the basis of a parcel. These kinds of decisions are 
generally taken for profit of some certain groups. With Tekeli's proposal, because of 
interest groups would have to buy construction rights as commodity from public 
administration, this situation would not be very profitable for them. Therefore, they 
won't want to construct high buildings or they will pay high taxes. In conclusion, both 
choices are good for future of cities which were transformed to a concrete mass 
nowadays.  
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5.2.1.3. Consolidation of Development Rights 
Another proposal for transferring urban land to public is 'Consolidation of Development 
Rights38 . This instrument is used generally during urban transformation processes. 
According to Consolidation of Development Rights Instrument, existing development 
rights which are on the basis of parcel are brought together on a project basis. Then 
created value is shared in the frame of public and private sector cooperation (Göksu; 
2003:3) 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Consolidation of Development Rights 
Resourse: translated from Faruk Göksu, Kentsel Dönüşüm Projelerinde Yenilikçi 
Yaklaşımlar, Kentsel Dönüşüm Sempozyumu, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi 
There are some successful examples of this instrument in Turkey such as ‘Dikmen 
Valley Project’ and ‘Portakal Çiçeği Urban Transformation Project’. Portakal Çiçeği 
Valley Project Model introduced a new approach to the participatory dimension of 
‘Project Democracy' concept with aiming direct participation to decisions of people who 
affected from the project. In this project, questions like 'how the project will be and can 
perform/ how to establish the rule of law of the project/ how to create project 
                                                           
38 In Turkish ‘İmar Haklarının Toplulaştırılması’ 
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financing/how will be the project management' designed with people those affected 
from the project directly (Göksu39). In addition to contributions to fair rent sharing, this 
model brought ‘authority sharing’ issue to the agenda. Sharing authority with different 
stakeholders in this model was a step from ‘top-down model’ to ‘governance’. Local 
administrations shared their authority with local public and other actors with the 
‘project democracy’ implementation. This was an important development to change the 
inactive role of public in rent distribution process. In result, this model advocates that 
the value created after urban transformation process will be distributed according to a 
project which is decided by all actors such as public and private. Therefore, urban rent 
will be shared more equally and so turn mostly to public. On the other hand, this model 
does not make sure of sharing rent equitable because of this system depends on 
bargaining. Therefore, negotiation and bargaining processes of this instrument should 
be made carefully in favor of the public.  
  
5.2.2. Assessing Choices for Resolving Agenda Items 
To reach the aim of more equitable rent sharing, there are two main subjects to decide 
on: 
Firstly, which instrument for transferring rent to the public will be used in which rent 
creation situation? For example, selling construction rights to investors seems like the 
best way to prevent land speculation in plan change/ modification situation. For the 
reason that,  the corruption is being done for high construction rights with various plan 
modifications. Therefore, buying construction rights at high amounts would not be easy 
as changing the plan. Interest groups would need to calculate their cost and benefits 
once more. If they prefer to build more, they had to pay and share the rent by this 
channel. On the other hand, consolidation of development rights instrument seems 
really useful for urban transformation processes. Since, dwellers of urban 
transformation areas do not have voice in decision making process. Thanks to this 
instrument, they will have right to speak for sharing created value. In addition to this, to 
avoid greedy investors in general Henry George’s taxation advice is the best. Since, 
making rent focused investment and holding the land by this channel will not be 
                                                           
39 http://dergi.mo.org.tr/dergiler/4/351/5061.pdf accessed 14.07.2014 
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profitable as before. On the other hand in practice making such a matching is really 
difficult. Taking into consideration of land value tax have potential to interfere to the 
both improper rent creation and unfair distribution processes, it is assessed as an 
appropriate instrument in addition to current rent distribution solutions in Turkey. 
Furthermore, becoming Land Value Taxation is untested instrument in Turkey and 
having lots of international experiences became effective for choosing this tool to 
examine in detail. 
The ideal form of taxation could be arranged according to benefit of the project for the 
public along with assessments of implementations by planning experts. If the project 
was found beneficial for public welfare, Land Value Taxation rate could be lower or 
taxation could be implied only for the projects which are not beneficial for public. At 
this point the problem is that, public welfare concept is changeable from person to 
person. This problem make nearly impossible to make an objective, ideology free 
assessment by experts. Therefore without any separation in tax rates, implying the same 
rate could make easier the practice except for special groups such as farmers or poor. In 
addition to this, preparing taxation zones could be a solution in order not to penalize 
vulnerable groups. These kinds of design details of taxation will be discussed in more 
detail in the following parts of the thesis. 
 
5.3. Selected Policy Implementation Tool: LAND VALUE TAXATION 
In the light of research, under a new land policy approach which supports ‘transferring 
urban rent to the public’, a new implementation tool for Turkey ‘Land Value Taxation’ 
will be examined in detail. 
 
5.3.1. What is Land Value Tax? 
Land Value Taxation is an urban land and economy policy tool which can be used to 
support the transferring urban rent to the public. ‘‘This tool splits the standard property 
tax into its two components of land values and building values. The tax rate is increased 
on the land part of the property and decreased on the building (Speirs; 2010:2).’’ As 
explained by Speirs, imposing higher tax rate on land rather than improvements has 
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many benefits. ‘‘Land is effectively in fixed supply, so an increase in the tax rate on 
land value will raise revenue without distorting the incentives for owners to invest in 
and make use of their land (Dye and England;2010:2)’’. This situation seems parallel 
with the current government policy in terms of supporting investment and job creation 
with this way. On the other hand, Dye and England stated that tax share on 
improvements and buildings on land discourage investments (2010:2). 
In the following table, there is a comparison between traditional property tax40 and 
proposed land value taxation. The revenue come from traditional system could be 
obtained by imposing different tax rates for land and improvements separately. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Revenue Obtained from Different Taxation Systems 
Source:(Dye and England;2010:6) 
In the table above difference among traditional property tax, two-rate property tax and 
pure land value tax is showed. When we look at traditional property tax, we see that tax 
on improvements is higher than tax on land. When we look at two-rate property tax we 
see that tax on land is higher than building but there is no much difference. Lastly, when 
we examined pure land value tax, we observe that all tax burden is on land. In the 
following parts, the effect of this situation will be examined in detail.  
 
 
                                                           
40 Difference traditional property tax from Land Value Taxation is as follows:  
In traditional property tax a common tax rate is applied for both land and building. 
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5.3.2. Has the policy created a positive impact on developing areas? Benefits of 
Land Value Taxation  
‘‘Apart from the moral argument that such a tax would return to society the value of 
land that society itself had created, it would have a number of other economic 
benefits.’’ According to Jones, thanks to land value taxation, people use land in more 
efficient way. As a result of landowners will pay the tax according to their land value, 
they prefer to use the land in its high and best use or they will sell it. Therefore, ‘‘It 
would end the wastefulness of derelict land and decaying buildings standing empty for 
years on end that blight neighborhoods. Furthermore, it would more or less end 
speculation on land, because it would become too costly (Jones; 2008:8)’’. 
In the report of Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, probable effects of land value taxation 
are grouped under several headings (Dye and England; 2010:7-12):  
Efficiency Advantages: According to Dye and England, land tax is efficient as a 
consequence of making the economy more productive. When land value tax is 
compared with other taxes, it can be said that most taxes transfer resources from the 
private sector in order to support government activities. On the other side, this attempt 
causes increase in the price of taxed service so harms market choices. They claimed that 
a land value tax does not harm investment choices because amount of land is fixed. In 
addition to this, they claimed that land value taxation could raise same revenue with 
traditional property tax without discouraging investment. Because, property tax 
‘‘discourages investment in new structures and maintenance of existing structures by 
reducing the return on such expenditures (Dye and England; 2010:8).’’ 
Burden on Landowners: ‘‘Most taxes are shared among producers, consumers, and 
other affected parties (e.g., suppliers, employees) as the price and amount of the taxed 
good change in response to the tax.’’ Dye and England stated that land tax burden is 
falls on landowners as a result of amount of land is unchanging (2010:8).  
Speculation and the Timing of Development: Dye and England pointed out that land 
value taxation prevent speculators from holding land for future to sell at a higher price. 
Therefore the tax encourages development of land.  
Sprawl and the Density of Development: In addition to the economical benefits, land 
value tax has advantages in terms of urban planning. According to Dye and England, as 
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a result of lowering taxes on buildings, there will be more density construction. They 
claim that same residents would accommodate in smaller area. Furthermore, housing 
prices will decrease and people can more afford to consume (2010:11).  
Revenue Adequacy: Dye and England pointed out that if land value tax is implicated, it 
will be two-rate tax instead of a pure land value tax. This means that improvements will 
subject to lower tax rate than the land itself. ‘‘In many cases the revenue stream from a 
pure land value tax would be an inadequate substitute for the revenues flowing from the 
traditional property tax.’’ They emphasized that it is difficult to meet fiscal expenditures 
without taxing improvements. Therefore, land value tax has to be in a form of two-rate 
tax system. They gave some examples such that ‘‘In Milwaukee, for example, all of the 
rents from land would have to be taxed away if its city government were to free 
buildings and other improvements from taxation and keep municipal spending at the 
same level. In Philadelphia, more than 80 percent of land rents would need to be 
collected by the city in order to maintain municipal revenues if improvements were 
exempted from taxation’’ (Dye and England; 2010:12). Therefore, differently from 
Henry George’s proposal, modified land value tax which advocates two-rate tax system 
should be practiced.  
We learned that land value tax have lots of benefits like encouraging development and 
maintenance of existing structures, making economy productive, preventing urban 
sprawl and charging tax burdens on landowners. 
After we examined comments of Dye and England, benefits of LVT will be explained 
with various exercises which were adapted from Speirs’s study ‘Land Value Taxation: 
An Underutilized Complement to Smart Growth Policies’.  
 
5.3.3. Exercises 
In the exercises, it will be showed that how a land value tax prevent speculation, affect 
development type and affordable housing. In this part of the study a land value taxation 
implementation / simulation will be presented in order to explain better the effects of 
taxation. With explaining these effects, we will be touching on the subject of ‘Georgist 
Perspectives on City Planning’. 
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5.3.3.1. Example 1 
The selected area which locates in Alaçatı/İzmir is thought as an example for land 
speculation issue. 
 
Figure 5.5 İzmir/Alaçatı District 
Source :own design on Google Maps 
In İzmir/ Alaçatı district, there are agricultural lands. Recently, functional change has 
been done in the upper scale plans of this area. In the new plan, current agricultural area 
has been transformed into a Tourism Center. After this change, land prices in this area 
increased a lot even though 1000 (implementation plan41) or 5000 scaled plans have not 
been prepared yet. 
Despite the fact that development rights of agricultural lands are too low for 
development in this area, there occurred an investment expectation. Therefore, high 
value trade of lands in the area takes place. In addition to this plan, there is another 
project, namely the ‘Alaçatı Port Project (luxury residential project)’ which also leads 
increase in land prices. 
                                                           
41 According to Law No 3194 : “Implementation Plan” is the plan which is drawn on 
approved base maps with cadastral drawings if available in accordance with the 
principles of the master plan, and contains in detail the building blocks of various zones, 
their density and order, roads and implementation phases to form the basis for land 
development implementation programmes and other information. 
http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/Laws/Law3194_LandDevelopmentPlanningandControl_20
10-12-31_EN_rev01.pdf accessed 27.07.2014 
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Figure 5.6 Upper Scale Plan (approved in 2011) 
Source:Alaçatı Belediyesi (photographed by Duygu Öcal before the Alaçatı Munipality 
was closed) 
 
Figure 5.7 Alaçatı Port Master Plan 
Source: http://i242.photobucket.com/albums/ff109/medsmeds/ngr.jpg?t=1209758467 
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According to oral information obtained from around real estate agents and real estate 
appraisers, it has been learned that price range in this area was 20-30 TL/m2 before the 
change in plan. According to interviews which were conducted with real estate 
appraisals, people usually demand high numbers and these high values which can be 
seen in the following table do not reflect the true and fair value.  
 
Area(m2) Land Use Price (tl/m2) Explanation 
1.480.00 Agricultural 109 FAR42:0.05 
21.140 Agricultural 47 FAR:0.05 
20000 Agricultural 20 FAR:0.05 
6180 Agricultural 97 FAR:0.05 
 
Figure 5.8 The fees quoted for land value 
Source: Information was taken from real estate appraisers who work in this region and 
real estate agents 
In the next part, effect of LVT to development and rent allocation structure will be 
presented with graphs. 
 
                                                           
42 FAR (FLOOR AREA RATIO) refers to ‘Emsal’ or ‘Kat Alanı Kat Sayısı (KAKS) in 
Turkish. According to Article 16 of 3030 Sayılı Kanun Kapsamı Dışında Kalan 
Belediyeler Tip İmar Yönetmeliği, its definition: ‘‘Yapının bütün katlardaki alanları 
toplamının parsel alanına oranından elde edilen sayıdır. Katlar alanı bodrum kat, asma 
kat, çekme ve çatı katı ve kapalı çıkmalar dahil kullanılabilen bütün katların ışıklıklar 
çıktıktan sonraki alanları toplamıdır. Açık çıkmalar, iç yüksekliği 1.80 m.yi aşmayan ve 
yalnızca tesisatın geçirildiği tesisat galerileri ve katları, ticari amacı olmayan ve yapının 
kendi ihtiyacı için otopark olarak kullanılan bölüm ve katlar, yangın merdivenleri, 
asansörler, kalorifer dairesi, kömürlük, sığınak, su deposu ve hidrofor bu alana 
katılmazlar. Kullanılabilen katlar deyiminden konut, işyeri, eğlenme ve dinlenme yerleri 
gibi oturmaya, çalışmaya, eğlenmeye ve dinlenmeye ayrılmak üzere yapılan bölümler 
ile bunlara hizmet veren depo ve benzeri alanlar anlaşılır.’’ 
http://imarkanunu.uzerine.com/index.jsp?objid=1451 accessed 27.07.2014 
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How an LVT implementation directs development? 
Now, we suppose that, we have a 6000 m2 empty lot in Alaçatı district. The assessed 
value on this lot is (6000*25) 150.000 TL. We suppose that property tax rate per year 
on this lot is 43 1.8 %. Therefore, property tax is 2700TL. This number means 225 TL a 
month. With this low tax price, landowner can hold this hold for 15-20 years because 
tax does not create monetary burden on land owner. As Speirs stated that ‘‘..There is no 
financial incentive to sell. If this lot is held by a speculator that is very likely what will 
happen to it.  (Speirs;2010: 20)’’. 
The problem here is that as we often emphasize in the thesis: ‘‘unfortunately, the only 
person benefiting from this arrangement is the lot owner. Neither the neighborhood nor 
community receives any benefits. For the neighborhood and community to benefit, the 
lot owner would need to develop the lot or sell to someone who would develop it 
(Speirs;2010: 21) ’’. 
Now we will try to understand that ‘If municipality enacts a land value tax, what would 
happen to the taxes on this area?’. We suppose that municipality will imply land value 
tax at a rate 8.5%. At that tax rate, the amount land owner will have to pay becomes 
12750 TL a year. This amount equals to nearly %8 of the assessment value. At this 
point Speirs take attention the point that ‘‘with this yearly tax bill this property owner 
will not want to hold on to this land for 15 or 20 years. The higher yearly tax bill not 
only increases the holding cost but increases the risk, as long as it is undeveloped, of 
this lot being a profitable investment (Speirs;2010:21,22)’’.  
                                                           
43 http://emlakkulisi.com/emlak-vergisi-nasil-hesaplanir-2014/246432 accessed 
30.07.2014 
 Figure 5.9 Tax burden with traditional property tax and LVT
Source:own design 
 
5.3.3.2. Example 2
In addition to discouraging landowners to make speculative 
Taxation has other advantages in terms of Urban Planning. Speirs stated that Land 
Value Taxation support owners to build densely (
developers prefer to build with higher density in order to make mo
that the tax encourages landowners
explained the benefits of building densely 
him as a result of Land Value Taxation, land owners prefer
holding them and they prefer revitalize of old buildings. Additionally, ‘‘Property 
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more on smaller lots, planners again should be careful to stick to planning decisions in 
terms of floor area ratio. 
In the following graph, there will be presented answer to the question of ‘how a land 
value tax creates compactness and density’. In this case, we continue our first scenario 
with various additions. We suppose that land owner will build a house on his land and 
we suppose that cost of building is 900.000TL. Now we will compare Land Value Tax 
and Traditional Property Tax in this case. Since under LVT tax burden will be only on 
land44, in land value taxation model there won’t be any change in tax amount for the 
building and land. However, in traditional property tax where the tax burden is on both 
land and buildings there will be an increase in tax amount.  
From the first example we know that the tax ratio for the land is %8.5 in LVT system. 
Therefore, land value tax is 12.750 TL.  Also we know that the tax rate %1.8 in 
traditional property tax system. In this case, the tax for the building and land will be 
equal to the 18.900TL.  
                                                           
44 Land Value Taxation can be taken only from land or both from land and 
improvements on it. In this example we assume that it is taken only from land. 
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Figure 5.10 Effect of LVT to tax burden 
Source: own design by inspired from Speirs 
From the graph we understand that if land owner holds the land the tax burden will 
increase for him but if he prefers to build on it, the tax bill will decrease. Speirs 
interpreted this situation is similar to ‘‘standard tax abatement given to developers for 
certain projects’’ (2010:25).  Therefore, there occurs an incentive to develop the land 
and decrease lot size. Furthermore, decrease in tax bill will decrease housing prices and 
there will be more housing consumption. In this case, taxation decisions must be taken 
carefully against the danger of housing boom with taking into consideration demand 
supply balance. 
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5.3.3.3. Example 3 
According to Speirs, land value tax contributes to affordable housing with two direct 
ways. First one is with decreasing housing prices which is the result of becoming ‘‘land 
is fixed in supply’’. He focused on developers buy the land cheaper in a competitive 
economy and sell housing less with maintaining their same profit. The second one is 
with decreasing ‘‘mortgage threshold’’. He stated that as a result of LVT decrease 
property tax, monthly mortgage will decrease which has positive correlation with 
property taxes. Speirs specifies that (by giving reference to the Center for the Study of 
Economics): ‘‘as an example, in 2007 the Center for the Study of Economics did a 
study on the effect land value taxation has had on the city of Titusville, Pennsylvania, 
which adopted LVT in 1990. The study found that with an LVT 72% of residential 
properties now have smaller tax bills than they would have with a traditional property 
tax45’’. 
Now we will try to understand ‘how Land Value Taxation encourages affordable 
housing’ with another exercise which is taken from directly the Speirs study. Speirs 
supposes that a person is looking to 158.000$ (8.000 for land, 150.000 for house) 
mortgage. In this exercise we try to find the yearly salary to compensate necessary 
mortgage which includes required tax and insurance payments (Speirs;2010:27). There 
will be presented that difference between traditional property tax and land value tax. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
45See http://www.urbantools.org/research-and-studies/recent-implementation-studies-
2007-2008  accessed 30.07.2014 
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Figure 5.11 Salary needed to afford mortgage with traditional property tax and 
LVT  
Source: Speirs:27 
We see from graph, the necessary salary is $40.500 with a traditional property tax. On 
the other hand, this amount decreases to $33.400 with Land Value Taxation. Speirs 
pointed out that this difference is important. Land value taxation helps to pay less 
mortgage bill. In addition to affordable housing, Speirs emphasized that quality is also 
important. He stated that ‘‘One of the problems of the current property tax structure is it 
rewards absentee landlords who allow their rental properties to fall into a deteriorated 
condition. Financially speaking, this makes ‘slum housing’ or ‘slum land lording’ a 
highly profitable form of real estate investment’’. He thinks that Land Value Taxation 
can contribute to solution of this problem. In the case of traditional property tax, tax bill 
increases when landlord makes any improvements. This situation causes landowners 
allow their building to depreciate as a result of their tax bill decreases (2010:28, 29).  
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5.3.4. How LVT Supports the Objectives of Transferring Urban Rent to the 
Public 
Support of Land Value Taxation for the transferring urban rent is mostly related ‘where 
the collected taxes will be used’. In this part of the study, there will be done some 
recommendations about how collected taxes should be transferred to the public? One of 
the important proposals in the light of research is that, taxation income should be used 
to create employment to provide income smoothing of poor people in cities. So, 
especially in urban transformation areas, high rent taxes should be taken and then, this 
money should be transferred to poor people not by directly but by creating some 
employment areas and giving them to education to be part of that job.   
Another proposal is that, taxes which are collected as a result of big rent projects should 
be directly transferred to a fund to establish public spaces. Big urban parks which 
include some social/educational buildings should be created at the same time with these 
speculative projects in order to show creating equality of opportunity is possible rather 
than income equality. With these kinds of projects while capital groups gain profit from 
this development, local people also benefit from that rent as a part of producer of it. By 
reason of providing income equality is too difficult in a neoliberal economy, one of the 
best ways to transfer urban rent to public is creating ‘urban public spaces’ with rent 
taxes.  
There is another proposal which is about welfare state understanding of Turkey. Urban 
rents could be used for basic rights of people such as social insurance, unemployment 
insurance, education.. There should be created a fund and then taxes which were 
collected should be transferred to that fund.  
The main aim of all proposals is transferring value which is produced publicly to public 
again. Moreover, collected rent taxes should advocate economical development at 
national level. We expect that income inequality will decrease because that unearned 
income will be not permitted. In summary, urban rent taxation is a big opportunity 
which could be evaluated for public interest thanks to its revenue earning potential.  
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5.3.5. Implementation of a Land Value Tax  
Implementation of Land Value Taxation has two dimensions. These are political and 
practical. Political dimension of implementation is related mostly legal side of the issue. 
There should be prepared a good designed legislation and created incentives for various 
stakeholders which will be discussed later. When we think practical side, in order to 
implement Land Value Taxation, there should be land use database of the country. 
Wightman stated that in order to value the land and assess the tax rate, there should be 
known the quantity of different land uses such as residential and agricultural (2010:10). 
Turkey has a land use database. Especially in big cities such as İstanbul and İzmir, these 
types of databases are being used for various city management systems. This handy 
database could be an advantage for Turkish experience. Beside these calculations, data 
collection and mapping, local administrations need to have a good designed GIS 
(Geographic Information System46) Project to determine and follow taxes. In Ireland, a 
LVT project was implemented using GIS technology. The aim of the project prepared 
by The Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability & Dublin Institute of 
Technology  was described as ‘‘to inform and stimulate a debate on the information 
implementation issues of a property tax based on Land Value for 
Ireland’’(Monaghan:2010). In the scope of the project site valuation maps were 
prepared as can be seen in the following figure. These kinds of GIS projects are 
important in order to gather qualitative data and spatial data together. With these maps, 
local governments and landowners can make any taxation inquiry online. Following the 
taxes, modifying and updating owner information, real estate valuations can become 
easier. 
                                                           
46 ‘‘A geographic information system (GIS) is a computer system for capturing, storing, 
checking, and displaying data related to positions on Earth’s surface. GIS can show 
many different kinds of data on one map. This enables people to more easily see, 
analyze, and understand patterns and relationships.’’  
http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/encyclopedia/geographic-
information-system-gis/?ar_a=1 accessed 29.07.2014 
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Figure 5.12 Site Valuation Map 
Source: Monaghan;2010:12 
The second required information is ‘who is the owner of which parcel’. This qualitative 
data should be collected and merged with geographical data. Again, big cities of Turkey 
have such databases. The importance of having the data especially for big cities is 
emphasized because the rent distribution problem is mostly observed in these cities. 
 
5.4. Existing Implementations in Other Countries 
It is known that, land value taxation is not a utopian proposal. There are lots of 
countries which have implemented land value taxation successfully. In this part of the 
study, we will examine countries which experienced Land Value Taxation. 
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Figure 5.13 Countries with Land Value Taxation Experience 
Source:Dye and England;2010:13 
 
5.4.1. U.S.-Pennsylvania 
USA experienced Land Value Taxation with Pennsylvania’s initiative. In 1913, 
Pittsburg and Scranton started to implement different tax rates for land and 
improvements. As of 2008, there are 16 Pennsylvania cities which implement Land 
Value Taxation (Dye and England;2010:13). In 1993, some school districts were also 
included into Land Value Taxation system. It is thought provoking that ratios are too 
much changeable from city to another city. ‘‘For instance, the small city of Aliquippa, 
which led the way towards the two-rate option for school districts, taxes land 16 times 
more heavily than buildings. Pittsburgh's tax rate on land is nearly six times the rate of 
buildings, the Titusville ratio is nearly 9 to 1, while Harrisburg's ratio which has been 3 
to 1 will soon change to 4 to 1(Hartzok47)’’. This difference seems rational and it 
probably changes according to cities which is more susceptible to speculation. When we 
think of Turkey, similar implementation could be also in cities such as İstanbul. 
                                                           
47 http://www.earthrights.net/docs/success.html accessed 02.07.2014 
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Harrisburg which is one of the Pennsylvania cities which operates a split-rate tax system 
experienced an improvement in the local economy after taxation. With the tax change, 
‘‘empty sites and buildings have been re-developed, with the number of vacant sites by 
2004 down by 85 per cent. The city authorities have issued over 32,000 building 
permits, representing nearly $4 billion of new investment – nearly 2,000 were issued in 
2004 alone. Over 5,000 housing units have been newly constructed or rehabilitated, and 
the number of businesses has jumped from 1,908 to 8,864, with unemployment down by 
19 per cent. Furthermore, crime has fallen by 58 per cent, and the number of fires has 
been reduced by 76 per cent, which the authorities say is due to more employment 
opportunities, and the elimination of derelict sites, making vandalism less likely. (Jones: 
9)’’. Jones stated that Land Value Tax triggered economic activities and public revenues 
increased. 
 
5.4.2. Denmark  
In Denmark a tax on unearned income was implemented in 1908 as a result of a railroad 
construction. Land Value Taxation came to the agenda in 1922. ‘‘In 1922 a bill on land 
value taxation to the state was passed. Four years later a similar bill on municipal land 
value was passed. In 1933 a bill on taxation of the unearned increment in land was 
carried. Through these different forms of taxation it was estimated that about half of the 
land rent created by society was collected for the people who created it (Kristensen48)’’. 
Today, public administrations collect a grundslyld (ground rent) averaging 2.4% of 
assessed value, and a 1% property tax at the national level. It is mentioned that LVT 
was effective in the past more than today and ‘‘in 1960’s, Denmark used a land value 
increment tax, and offered a national farm-lease program’’49. According to another 
source, Denmark had a Georgistic party at that times (1957-60) 50 and this could be the 
reason of becoming more influential in the past. This Georgist party’s economic policy 
was ‘‘to collect the economic rent of land and abolish all taxes on labour and capital51’’. 
Vickers stated that in his Danish Tax Notes: ‘‘the level of Denmark’s property taxes is 
                                                           
48 http://www.grundskyld.dk/2-assessment.html accessed 02.07.2014 
49 http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem4.htm accessed 02.07.2014 
50 http://www.grundskyld.dk/2-assessment.html accessed 02.07.2014 
           51 http://www.glasswings.com.au/geonomics/denmark.html accessed 30.07.2014 
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not very high compared to that in Sweden or in UK. However its property tax system is 
among the most mature in the world and the cost of its administration possibly the 
lowest, expressed as a proportion of revenue raised from it (a quarter of that in UK in 
1995/6). LVT (grundskyld) appears not to cause any increase in costs of that system, 
even though the assessed value is 100% of market value (unlike Sweden, which uses 
75% as a device to reduce the precision needed in valuations). Denmark has a tax on 
‘gross’ property values (i.e. including building value) as well as LVT. The property tax 
revenue goes to central government, whereas LVT goes to local authorities’’ (Vickers: 
1). 
 
5.4.3. Australia  
Australia is a pioneer example because state uses LVT to finance its budget. There are 
some different LVT implementations in Australia. For instance, even though in some 
areas unimproved land is taxed, in some areas improved land is taxed. Rules are 
changeable according to the state or municipality. Another difference is that, ‘‘the 
federal government enacted a land value tax in 1910 to finance an old-age pension 
program and to break up large tracts of idle land’’. In 1952 implementation of this 
national land tax was stopped in part because ‘‘it failed to break up large estates and in 
part to provide additional tax base to local governments across Australia’’ (Dye and 
England; 2010:16). When land value data is observed from 1911 to 1999, it can be seen 
that ‘‘ privately collected land rent to be as much as 26% of Australian GDP ,  more 
than the 24% of GDP currently collected in taxes, of which only a very small portion is 
publicly collected land rent’’ 52. This situation indicates that, even though there is 
taxation implementation, tax amounts which is taken by public are little when we 
compare with the actual rent. It can be observed from the graph that there are huge 
difference between captured land rent and privatized land rent. 
                                                           
52 http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem42.htm accessed 02.07.2014 
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Figure 5.14 Share of Land Value Taxation in Australian GDP 
Source: http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem42.htm 
 
5.4.4. China and Hong Kong  
China and Hong Kong are successful countries which implement Land Value Taxation. 
More than %35 of their tax revenue comes from urban rent tax. Therefore, other tax 
rates are very low and generally their budget has a surplus. Although these two states 
have small area, they have large population and urbanization structure. As a result of 
scarcity of land, significant portion of land is owned by state. So, investors rent lands 
for long periods. Land rent revenues which are obtained from rental constitutes a large 
part of public income (Ökmen and Yurtsever; 2010:67).  
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5.4.5. Hawaii  
Hawaii is a bad example for Land Value Taxation which has lessons to be learned. 
Hawaii has started to implement land value tax in 1963. The state hoped that Land 
Value Taxation will trigger real estate development and tourism. As a result of various 
reasons, there was a tourism explosion in Honolulu during the 1960-70s. As a result of 
the boom, Waikiki Beach faced with extensive construction of high density projects. 
Joni Mitchell described this transformation such that ‘‘They paved paradise and put up a 
parking lot…” (Dye and England; 2010:14). Dye and England stated that even though 
inadequate urban planning and bad zoning decisions were the real reason behind the 
situation, local officials and editorial writers saw land value taxation as responsible. 
Therefore, Land Value Taxation Policy was repealed in 1977(2011:14-15). 
  
 
Figure 5.15 Waikiki Beach,Honolulu, Hawaii 
Source:Dye and England;2011:15 
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5.4.6. Assessment of International Examples 
After we examined the experiences of Land Value Taxation around the world, we 
conclude that this is not a utopian objective. There are several implementations for 
decades and also today there are countries which use Land Value Taxation. All these 
past experiences make it possible to make an evaluation and statistical analysis for 
before and after Land Value Taxation. 
When we examined the examples, we found that some outcomes were in line with 
conclusions discussed in theory. As a matter of fact, we saw that land value taxation 
may improve government finances and provide compact development.. 
 
5.5. Land Value Tax Proposal for Turkey  
Before the proposal we will discuss policy questions which will give a shape to the 
policy tool ‘Land Value Taxation’. 
 
5.5.1. Policy Questions 
The questions that we have to answer to design Land Value Taxation are determined in 
the report of HABİTAT (Walters; 2011:32-33-34). Walters grouped these questions 
under several headings as in the following tables: 
 
Defining the base for the LPT53 
‘‘What should be included in the base? It can include land only, land and immovable 
improvements, just the improvements, or different combinations of land and 
improvements for different types of land use.’’ 
‘‘How should value be determined, and how often should it be updated? As noted the 
LPT can be based on the market value of the real estate, proxies for market value or 
selected physical and locational attributes. ’’ 
‘‘Who will owe the tax? Part of defining the base includes determining who will owe 
                                                           
53 Land and Property Tax 
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the LPT. Will it be assigned to the owners of land or those who actually use the land? ’’ 
‘‘Should these decisions regarding general approach and incidence be uniform 
throughout a country or should they vary within a country depending on local 
conditions such as the quality of real estate markets or the nature of recognized property 
rights? ’’ 
‘‘Which types of property or ownership classes should be exempted from the LPT, if 
any, and why? One of the issues confronting every jurisdiction implementing an LPT is 
exemptions. ’’ For example, it is common, though not necessary, to exempt 
government-owned property. Temporary exemptions have also been granted in some 
cases because of natural disasters. 
‘‘Which level of government and which agency should determine which properties are 
exempt? ’’ 
 
Setting the tax rate 
‘‘Should all property be taxed at the same rate? If some property or some property 
owners are exempted from the LPT, not all property will be taxed at the same rate. But 
beyond exemptions, should rural farm land and urban residences be taxed at the same 
rate? Should businesses and households be taxed the same? Should poor households and 
better off households face the same tax rate? ’’ 
‘‘Which level of government and which agency should set the tax rate? Setting the rate 
at the national or regional level assures uniformity and avoids tax competition. 
Allowing local governments to set the rate empowers local officials and fosters local 
autonomy. In some cases the national or provincial government establishes a range for 
the rate, and the local governments are allowed to determine the final rate within that 
range. ’’ 
 
Coverage 
‘‘How will information be shared between agencies controlling land ownership and 
occupancy records, construction records and tax records? In many instances, there is 
very poor communication and cooperation between these agencies. But each controls 
some of the information required to manage an accurate cadastre and other land records. 
Pooling of all information related to land and land use is an important step in achieving 
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high coverage ratios. ’’ 
‘‘Will it be necessary to change other laws in order to assure that the required sharing 
takes place? ’’ 
‘‘Will one agency be responsible for “discovering” new property? Can this 
responsibility be shared? ’’ 
‘‘Who will provide the technical and financial resources to establish and maintain 
accurate land and property records? The assistance of donor agencies may prove very 
helpful in initiating an up-to-date cadastre, but maintaining the cadastre over time will 
require resources. ’’ 
 
Valuation 
‘‘What staff skills and training will be required in order to maintain values at legally 
required levels? ’’ 
‘‘Which level of government and which agency should be responsible for maintaining 
accurate taxable values? ’’ 
‘‘Who will provide the technical and financial resources to establish and maintain 
acceptable valuation practices? ’’ 
‘‘Will valuation practices be monitored and evaluated regularly to assure fairness and 
accuracy? If so, by whom? ’’ 
 
Collection 
‘‘Which agency will be responsible for collecting the LPT? ’’ 
‘‘How will tax bills be distributed? ’’ 
‘‘Where and how will taxes be collected? This is an important point because it affects 
the compliance costs for taxpayers. If taxpayers must travel some distance to a central 
tax office to pay their LPT, compliance will be lower than if paying the tax is more 
convenient. ’’ 
‘‘What process will be used to handle appeals? ’’ 
‘‘What sanctions will be used in cases of nonpayment of taxes? ’’ 
‘‘Will there be oversight by other agencies or other levels of government? ’’ 
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5.5.2. Land Value Taxation for Turkey 
In this part of the study a proposal for Turkey will be developed using ‘Land Value Tax 
for Scotland (Wightman; 19)’. Furthermore, the proposal will try to answer above 
questions as much as possible. 
*All land in Turkey will be subject to ‘Land Value Taxation’ except for lands of 
specific classes 
*Rates will be determined at the discretion of public institutions. 
*A land use database will be developed in order to have information on all use of land 
in Turkey. All local municipalities would be able to access to this database in order to 
register changes. 
*The implementation of land value tax will be done by municipalities. 
*Land values should be determined according to current market values and it should be 
updated regularly. 
*Common public places such as open spaces, public transportation infrastructures and 
open water areas will be exempt from Land Value Taxation. 
*Land owners older than 60 have right to roll up their Land Value Tax liabilities. These 
taxes can be paid from the earnings of sale of their property. 
 
5.5.3. Exemptions for Specific Classes 
During Land Value Taxation Implementation, there should be special regulations for 
vulnerable groups such as the poor and farmers. 
*Farmland: According to the report of HABITAT, farmers are one of the special 
groups for taxation implementation. One of the solutions to decrease tax burden on 
farmers is to adopt a lower tax rate. There is another proposal which offers to value 
agricultural land according to its current use instead of potential for development. 
‘‘Thailand, for example, convenes a panel of agricultural experts to evaluate the typical 
agricultural productivity of various agricultural land categories in different parts of the 
country. Valuation is then based on this assessment of farm productivity. The result is 
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that the final tax burden on agricultural land is generally much lower than on other land 
valued with market value concepts (Walters;2011:103)’’. 
In addition to farmers, there could be some exemptions for people who engaged in 
farming in the city such as market gardening54. 
*The Poor: ‘‘There are often two motivations for granting LPT relief to low income 
households. First, even if taxed, the revenue collected from the poor may not exceed the 
cost of collecting the tax. Second, in countries where significant proportions of the 
population live in extreme poverty, it may seem unfair and unreasonable to add to their 
burdens through the tax system (Walters; 2011:103).’’ One of the suggestions for poor 
people is that poor people pay the taxes but then they have right to apply for a rebate. 
There is also another different discount system for granting tax relief. Target groups of 
this system are pensioners, veterans, and the disabled. Decision of granting criteria will 
be made by local governments (Walters; 2011:104). 
 
5.5.4. Policy Incentives to Encourage Adoption of LVT 
Edward H.Clarke prepared a study about ‘‘how you design ‘financial laws’ that act as a 
complement to LVT and, more importantly, force, or strongly encourage, the adoption 
of LVT as a source of financing public services’’. Clarke pointed out ‘effective 
coordination’ and ‘incentive compatible’ issues. He stated that ‘‘we can design a set of 
incentive compatible expenditure arrangements that motivate the districts to return, to 
the extent appropriate, to the land tax (or rent) as a final source of revenue’’. He put an 
emphasis on: ‘‘No one is going to seriously move forward on LVT when people think 
they can get what they want largely for free. We need to live with that realization. 
However, we often have episodic periods of reform when broad, if discrete, 
administrative measures might be undertaken in conjunction with an eye towards 
instituting what amounts to benefit taxation ( Clarke55).’’ 
‘‘Incentive compatibility is important in interactions in which at least one participant 
does not know perfectly what another participant knows or does. Problems may arise 
when the participant with more information has an incentive to use that information for 
                                                           
54 In Turkish ‘bostancılık’ 
55 http://www.wealthandwant.com/docs/Clarke_Geoism.html accessed 10.07.2014 
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personal benefit at the expense of others56’’. Turkey now has an experience similar to 
this description. Since, there is an informal rent distribution among various interest 
groups, these groups have an incentive to use their power/ authority for their personal 
benefits at the expense of public. Land Value Taxation proposal intervenes to this de 
facto rent distribution with a formal taxation system. As a result of benefits of different 
groups are changeable with this taxation system, there should be found an equilibrium 
point. With various incentives, we can try to maximize different stake holders’ 
willingness to pay for a land value tax. Therefore, the proposal is tried to be designed 
with taking into consideration ‘who wants Land Value Taxation and why’.  
What incentives do taxpayers have to pay the tax? 
According to report of HABITAT, tax payers need to be informed about calculation of 
taxes. They should know that taxes are being collected in a fair way (2011:6). 
Furthermore, ‘‘Taxpayers should be able to see the connection between the taxes they 
pay and the services they receive from government (Walters; 2011:6)’’. In the same 
report, ‘building public support’ is mentioned with public meetings, advertisements, 
meeting with community groups and media. 
It should be explained to people that ‘‘the proposal here is not to increase taxes but to 
shift and reduce taxation. Unless you own a valuable vacant lot, the proposal presented 
below would most likely reduce your total tax bill, since if fully implemented it 
abolishes taxes on your earnings and spending, and it also eliminates the portion of real 
property taxes that falls on buildings and other improvements (Foldvary;2006:2)’’.  
Jones made a contribution to incentive issue in terms of capitalist taxpayers. He 
underlined investing on other activities rather than land with saying that: ‘’The point is 
that even capitalists would gain from a land value tax – even big landowners if they sold 
their land and invested the proceeds in other productive activities. The only exception 
would be those engaged in land speculation (Jones; 2008:35).’’ 
What incentives does government have to enact land value taxation?  
We know that Land Value Taxation encourages development instead of holding land. 
This is especially relevant for Turkey where construction sector plays an important role. 
                                                           
56http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1981666/incentive-compatibility 
accessed 19.07.2014 
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Vitality of construction sector creates employment and this issue is important for future 
of government. Jones explained the relation between the taxation and mobilization of 
the construction industry in that ‘‘because the more that land is taxed the more this 
provides an incentive to invest capital on the land in the form of buildings and other 
economic activities (2008:9).’’ On the other side, governments are interested in welfare 
of public as a result of worry of sustaining political power. Therefore, benefits of Land 
Value Taxation such as providing revenue for local governments and decreases in 
housing prices could be one each incentive to enact Land Value Taxation. 
 
5.5.5. A New Division of Labour to Encourage Adoption of LVT 
In the thesis, there has been made a proposal in order to prevent cities from improper 
rent creation interventions and provide fair share of urban rent. Now it has to be thought 
about ‘how to include all related actors to the processes’. In order to follow the 
‘transferring urban rent to the public’ proposal, adoption of ‘governance’ concept based 
on a new division of labor among stakeholders can be thought as helping hand. 
Governance will affect the implementation of our proposal and anticipate its results. 
With governance understanding which advocates meeting all the actors’ expectations 
and ideas on the same ground, there could be more fair rent distribution processes.  
Moreover, governance implies to share responsibilities with a society in different ways 
such as project democracy. Accordingly, city governing will change into active, 
accountable and transparent process. Therefore, the problems encountered will reduce 
and timely provided public support will contribute to legitimacy of government’s acts. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Why is the current policy not working? & Why is it necessary to find an alternative? 
"Take now... some hard-headed business man, who has no theories, but knows how to 
make money. Say to him: "Here is a little village; in ten years it will be a great city-in 
ten years the railroad will have taken the place of the stage coach, the electric light of 
the candle; it will abound with all the machinery and improvements that so enormously 
multiply the effective power of labor. Will in ten years, interest be any higher?" He will 
tell you, "No!" Will the wages of the common labor be any higher...?" He will tell you, 
"No the wages of common labor will not be any higher..." "What, then, will be higher?" 
"Rent, the value of land. Go, get yourself a piece of ground, and hold possession." And 
if, under such circumstances, you take his advice, you need do nothing more. You may 
sit down and smoke your pipe; you may lie around like the lazzaroni of Naples or the 
leperos of Mexico; you may go up in a balloon or down a hole in the ground; and 
without doing one stroke of work, without adding one iota of wealth to the community, 
in ten years you will be rich! In the new city you may have a luxurious mansion, but 
among its public buildings will be an almshouse (George; 1935:293-294)." 
This little story summarizes the unchanged view of people for years on unearned rent 
income. As Henry George stated above, still today people prefer to invest their money 
on land in order to maximize profits through land speculation. Nobody is bothered by 
the fact that they gain too much without any effort. This can be seen as efficient when is 
thought individually but in fact it is not efficient in terms of total production/GDP of a 
country. Foldwary explained this case as in the following: ‘‘with a lower price of land, 
funds that now go to buy land would instead go to build more capital goods, hire more 
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labor, or provide better training (2006:8)’’. To the extent that people prefer to invest 
their money in land instead of production, unemployment and income inequality will 
increase.  
Earning money without working thanks to urban rent is a big incentive problem. In 
order to avoid this incentive problem, there need to be a good designed taxation 
program. This taxation program should prevent people from investing in urban land 
instead of productive areas. Here, governments have to find a point which provides 
balance between efficiency and equality. It is known that big capital groups would not 
be happy with these kinds of regulations. On the other hand it is the state’s mission to 
distribute urban development equally because, urban rent occurs as a result of urban 
development. Moreover, urban development is product of all people who live in that 
city. Today, only certain groups are taking advantage of this rent, lots of people are 
struggling with poverty in cities. Therefore, the main discussion of the thesis is to 
distribute urban rent more fairly. 
In the context of 'transferring urban rent to the public', Land Value Taxation is proposed 
as an appropriate tool. It should be mentioned that, Land Value Taxation may be 
successful when it is used with current rent distribution tools. In addition to this, Land 
Value Taxation instrument should be tested through some pilot projects in areas where 
rents are high (such as İstanbul). There should be made some regulations according to 
results of these pilot projects.  
Political Dimension of Implementation  
Dye and England stated that ‘‘any tax policy change must meet the test of being 
politically acceptable to the public at large (2010:26)’’. Acceptability of land value tax 
should be discussed from two perspectives. On one side, this taxation will not be 
wanted by landowners. On the other side, this system could be beneficial for middle-
low classes because the taxation causes decrease in land prices and consequently in 
housing prices. Hence it can be said that there would be both winners and losers. 
Skaburskis and Tomalty pointed out that ‘‘The immediate redistribution consequences 
of a move toward land value taxation would be the shift of tax burdens from owners of 
well built out property to the owners of underused or vacant inner city land. In the long 
run the land tax would reduce burdens on the developers and eventual owners of 
property that exploit fully the advantages of a site and increase burdens on the other 
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owners. The fairness of these redistribution consequences may be questioned on the 
grounds that the owners of underused land may have paid a price that reflects the future 
value of the land under the current tax regime and would suffer financial losses while 
waiting for their development opportunities to emerge’’(1997:405).  
In this thesis, we tried to reveal current schemes of rent creation in Turkey and the 
results of this scheme. Then we are putting an alternative project to the existing rent 
distribution order. Even though Land Value Taxation suggestion annoys some specific 
interest groups, we expect that this suggestion will be rooted in the memory of 
community. Thus, people could dispute present arrangements over this alternative 
suggestion. Because, today experiences in Turkey show us that we need to explore 
different ways to provide healthy and sustainable development in cities. Therefore, 
Land Value Taxation can be thought to be a remedy and as an alternative for current 
implementations which depend on commodification of land. Academicians, politicians 
and city planners should come together to design a disincentive taxation system with 
taking Land Value Taxation as an example. In the thesis costs-benefits and incentives 
for the different stakeholders are revealed. Out of this, the last word will be said by 
politicians because putting into action the Land Value Taxation Proposal is in fact a 
political decision. Politicians who have the courage to accept such a bill probably will 
lose their some supporters. At this point, there need to be found politicians who hold 
public interest superior to their own interests. 
Consequences of Land Value Taxation on Urban Form and Regional Development 
According to the review of the theoretical literature, land value taxation has various 
suggestions in terms of urban planning. These are designation and implementation of 
Land Value Taxation in a way to increase development, increase density and discourage 
to hold empty land in urban areas (Skaburskis and Tomalty ;1997:406). Skaburkis and 
Tomalty pointed out that urban planners worry about ‘‘the land base is largely outside 
the core area and that a land value tax would ignore the major asset of central cities, 
namely the capital embedded in the built form’’ . According to Skaburkis and Tomalty, 
especially central city planners are more caring in land value taxation and they advocate 
‘‘region-wide basis implementation with a pooled assessment base’’(1997:412). 
Moreover, they stated that big part of taxable land will be in suburbs as a result there is 
not much empty land in city centers. Therefore, there can obtain various side effects 
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such as ‘‘conflicts over density issues, volatility in assessments, spatial redistribution 
flowing’’. In order to manage with these side effects, again region-wide tax pooling is 
suggested by financial officers to maintain assessment base of central cities. 
Furthermore, some urban planners recommended that improved attention need to be 
showed while doing zoning arrangements in order to control density changes 
(1997:412,413).  Another issue which is emphasized by Skaburskis and Tomalty is 
impacts of Land Value Taxation in peripheral areas such as ‘‘penalties on farmers, 
bankruptcies of smaller development firms, and increase of development pressures in 
areas not yet ‘ripe’ for development’’. They stated that, when taxes rise in peripheral 
lands, land owners will hurry to expand suburbs and this situation will lead growth the 
urban area. According to the some officials, there should be ‘‘stricter planning controls 
and improved staging of infrastructure investments’’. There is a suggestion which 
advocates a special exemption for peripheral land until becoming ready for 
development. Related to this suggestion, it is stated that planners should show great 
sensitivity while making urban plans because of the market for different building types 
increase (Skaburkis and Tomalty; 1997:413). 
In result, probable consequences of Land Value Taxation should be estimated in 
implementation areas and there should be taken precautions for negative results. 
General Consequences 
Consequently, this thesis makes an observation about rent creation & distribution 
instruments of Turkey and a land value taxation instrument which is established in order 
to solve urban rent redistribution problem. Nevertheless, so far few studies of the 
effectiveness of land value taxation process has been carried out by government and 
related institutions in Turkey. Therefore, this thesis has made a contribution to filling 
this gap by making a policy proposal and examining various examples of Land Value 
Taxation. Finally, this thesis captures some of the results after examining whole 
process. 
In the Development of Current Policies part, we examined the impacts of neoliberal 
policies on the urban land policy of Turkey. We investigated that, related to neoliberal 
regime, political interventions to the urban land are mostly focused on how to create 
rent. The legal regulations which were enacted after 2002 can be interpreted as servicing 
these rent creation processes.  
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The basic research question of the thesis ‘how to transfer urban rent’ has been explained 
with examining various rent distribution instruments. Among these instruments ‘Land 
Value Taxation’ is explained in detail with various exercises and foreign country 
examples.  
Economic theory suggests that, compared to a traditional property tax, land value 
taxation promotes efficient use of society’s resources, encourages local economic 
development, and probably discourages urban sprawl (Dye and England:17). In the 
thesis shift from a traditional property tax to a land value tax is explained with some 
simulations in order to move a step further from these theoretical arguments. In our first 
exercise, we examined how the tax burden of the traditional property tax and LVT differ 
from each other. Before an area has a development plan, doing changes on it’s upper 
scale plan puts the urban lands in this area to the attention of speculators. Local 
capitalists and interest groups see the area as a profitable investment. We showed in the 
exercise the deterrent effect of land value tax against rent focused speculative 
investments. In the phase of the decision of any investment, investor will make a cost 
benefit analysis and with land value taxation, holding the land with 15 or 20 years won’t 
be profitable. Therefore, Land Value Taxation directs development in a way in which 
urban planning alone can not be enough successful. Enacting the land value taxation has 
a meaning other than stopping speculative investments. Land value taxation causes 
increase in build densely. In a second exercise, we examined the effect of LVT for 
infilling areas and revitalizing old buildings as a result of which holding areas will not 
be sensible actions anymore. In the scenario, we see that tax burden of unfilled land is 
too high. Therefore, land owner prefers to build or sell. In the last case, it is expressed 
that becoming owner of a house with mortgage credit which includes tax payments is 
easier with Land Value Taxation. In this context, the salary needed to afford mortgage 
with traditional property tax and LVT is compared.  
Subsequent to exercises, various experiences of Land Value Taxation are examined to 
investigate results that we obtained from simulations. Analyzing the existing 
experiences is beneficial in order to understand how Land Value Taxation might operate 
in Turkey. After surveying international examples, we conclude that Land Value 
Taxation idea has been working successfully. These experiences prove that Land Value 
Taxation is applicable beside acceptable economically.  
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As a result, we analyzed how the Land Value Taxation can be used in order to transfer 
urban rent to the public. It is difficult to understand the process of the Land Value 
Taxation with only the Henry George theorem which discusses the rent creation process 
from mostly on land speculation/speculative investments. Today, there is increase in 
variety of rent creation instruments as we analyzed in the thesis. From this point of 
view, land value taxation model is inadequate. An alternative broader rent taxation 
model should be developed. Dynamics of the market and political culture should be 
understood in detail and modified land value taxes could be designed for all rent 
creation projects. 
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